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INTRODUCTION
The expiration of a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA")
before the parties reach a new settlement presents a vexing problem.
Under contract law, a contract ends once the parties have performed
their duties under the contract, leaving both parties free from further
obligation.' One can quickly comprehend the difficulty this poses in
the labor setting. If a CBA expires, may the employees simply stop
working? If they continue to work, may the employer stop paying,
given its release from the terms of the prior obligation?
To prevent the occurrence of such undesirable breaks in the em-
ployer/employee relationship, and to maintain the existing relation-
ship, traditional private sector labor law provides that many of the
terms of collective agreements survive CBA expiration.2 For example,
1 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRa(rs § 235 (1) (1979) ("Full performance
of a duty under a contract discharges the duty.").
2 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962), holds that a "unilateral change in condi-
tions of employment under negotiation is... a violation of [the good faith bargaining
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if an employer decides to give its employees raises without bargaining
for them, private sector labor precedent maintains that such a wage
increase is, in essence, a refusal to bargain.3 By offering raises without
negotiation, the employer undercuts the collective bargaining process
and the status of the union.4 This practice violates the stated policy of
national labor relations: "to eliminate the causes of certain substantial
obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and elimi-
nate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining... for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of... employment."5 Because
wages are a mandatory subject of bargaining,6 the failure to negotiate
a wage change subverts national labor policy and is illegal.7
This private sector labor policy of maintaining agreements after
expiration is also important in the public sector because the govern-
ment and public sector employees provide vital, often monopolistic,
municipal services to the public. As a result, the necessity for
survivability of the terms of public sector agreements is sometimes
more compelling than for private sector agreements. 8 For example,
should municipal rubbish collectors end their service simply because
their collective agreement has expired? Are teachers to stop teaching
if their collective agreement has ended? Likewise, should expiration
of the agreement free the municipality from its obligation to pay its
employees? Obviously, none of these outcomes is desirable. The
provision of the National Labor Relations Act]". Under this rule, an employer cannot
implement unilateral changes that disturb the status quo until the parties negotiate to
impasse. For further discussion of this case, see infra Parts I.C and III.C-D. Technically,
"the terms of a collective bargaining do not 'survive' expiration. Rather, they retain their
legal significance because they define the status quo, which may not be altered, except
under certain circumstances." Paul Bosanac, Expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement:
Survivability of Terms and Conditions of Employment, 4 LAB. LAW. 715, 715 (1988).
3 See Katz, 369 U.S. at 746 (characterizing an employer's wage increase without notice
to the union as "tantamount to an outright refusal to negotiate on that subject").
4 See id, at 744-47.
5 National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994) [hereinafter NLRA]; see
also Neal M. Davis, Note, Scape of Collective Bargaining in Public Education: Toward a Compre-
hensive Balancing Test, 36 WASH. U.J. URit. & CONTEMP. L. 107, 123 (1989) (stating that the
goal of collective bargaining statutes is to further "equitable and harmonious labor rela-
tions"). Thus, circumventing collective bargaining obligations subverts national labor
policy.
6 See NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
7 See Katz, 369 U.S. at 747.
8 Often, public employees are the primary provider of important services, such as
refuse collection or education. In contrast, private sector products and services typically
come from more than one source, rendering a private sector production or service stop-
page by one employer less noticeable and less vital to the general public's well-being. See
DAVID DENHOLM, BEYOND PUBUC SECrOR UNIONISM: A BETrER WAY 1-2 (3d ed. 1993) (dis-
tinguishing the services the two sectors provide); TERRY L. LEAP, COL.LEGrM BARGAINING
AND LABOR RELATIONS 633 tbl.17-1 (1991) (listing the differences between the private and
public sectors).
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unacceptability of such situations becomes readily apparent when one
considers the prospect of no trash collection for a month, or no stu-
dents in school for, possibly, a year or longer. Thus, because public-
sector agreements affect the entire population, the need to continue
municipal services uninterrupted is especially strong.9
After establishing that the need for the survivability of terms of
collective public sector agreements is evident, the question becomes:
Which terms survive? This Note investigates this question in public
education collective agreements. Specifically, this Note addresses the
contentious issue of survivability of salary step increases when a CBA
expires.10 Part I synopsizes the history of collective bargaining in edu-
cation, explains how the step increase issue commonly arises, and ana-
lyzes the development of legal precedent applicable to the situation.
Part II of this Note explores the treatment of this issue in all fifty states
and the District of Columbia, focusing on a few states that serve as
paradigms for various responses to, or resolutions of, the issue. After
discussing the weaknesses of other approaches, Part III argues that the
best solution to the step increase issue is to require school boards to
pay step increases after expiration, but to allow certain employer de-
g See Richard G. Neal, It's Time to Cut Back on Collective Bargainingfor Teachers and Other
Public Employees, 14J. CoLLECIVE NEGOTIATIONS PUB. SECTOR 91, 92-93 (1985) (noting the
difference in the nature of services in the private and public sectors that prevent the gov-
ernment from going out of business-govemment services are essential to the needs of its
citizens and are usually monopolistic, whereas the private sector offers more choices to
consumers than the public sector).
10 Salary step increases are raises teachers receive each year based upon qualifications
and experience/length of service. The qualifications factor is usually in columns, while
the experience factor is in rows. Together, the columns and rows constitute the "salary
schedule." In the columns, teachers earn different salaries depending on the degree held:
bachelor's, master's, or doctorate. In addition, some schedules include intermediate col-
umns, such as "masters + 30," which denotes a master's degree plus thirty credit hours of
additional graduate work. In the rows, teachers earn a higher salary for each year of
experience.
The parties determine a salary schedule using a "base," or minimum amount. Typi-
cally, a first-year teacher who holds only a bachelor's degree would earn the base. For
every year thereafter, teachers earn the base plus a certain percentage. Likewise, for every
column beyond the bachelor's column, teachers earn a certain percentage above the base.
Typically, however, the numbers appear on the schedule in actual dollar amounts, and not
in percentages. For example, a first-year teacher holding a master's degree may earn the
base plus 5%. With a base of $25,000, that teacher would earn $26,250. A second-year
teacher may earn the base plus 8%, or $27,000. The parties fix the percentages during
negotiations. Educators, negotiators, school boards, and courts call the elevation from one
step to another (here, from "base + 5%" to "base + 8%") a step increase, or sometimes an
increment. Most often, teachers automatically receive such increases. However, the par-
ties may make provisions for denial of a teacher's increase if that teacher is performing
poorly. This Note discusses the raises based upon experience only. Most teachers infre-
- quently, if ever, change columns based upon qualifications, so those raises are not subjects
of regular, annual increases. For an example of a salary schedule, see OKLA. STAT. AN'fN. tit.
70, § 18-114.7 (West Supp. 1996); see alsoJames C. May, The Law and Politics of Paying Teach-
ers Salary Step Increases upon Expiration of a Collective Bargaining Agreement 20 VT. L. REv. 753,
756 n.10 (1996) (explaining the salary schedule system).
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fenses to the rule and to permit the parties to contract explicitly that
the board will not pay step increases after expiration.
I
LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of Public Sector Bargaining
The history and current state of private and public sector bargain-
ing differ significantly. Public sector collective bargaining has shallow
roots but large branches; private sector bargaining has deeper roots
but arguably withering branches.1' The private sector labor move-
ment began in the middle of the nineteenth century. 12 The passage
in 1935 of the Wagner Act,13 which after several amendments has be-
come the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"),14 introduced to pri-
vate sector employees a protected right to bargain collectively. In
1958, private sector union membership was almost 17 million, or 39%
of the private sector work force.15 However, by 1978, only 20% of pri-
vate sector employees belonged to labor unions.' 6 As of 1992, the
percentage of unionized private sector employees had shrunk to
11.5%. 17 In contrast, the percentage of unionized public sector em-
ployees has grown significantly, well surpassing that of private sector
union membership-during the 1960s and 1970s, the rate of public
sector unionism grew rapidly,' 8 and by 1992, 36.7% of public employ-
ees belonged to labor unions. 19
11 See LEAP, supra note 8, at 633 (noting that collective bargaining in the public sector
is new compared to private sector bargaining, and the extent of unionism in the public
sector "greatly exceeds" organization among private sector workers).
12 See CHARLES TAYLOR KERCHNER & DOUGLAS E. MITCHELL, THE CHANGING IDEA OF A
TEACHERS' UNION 46 (1988). For a more explicit account of the growth of the labor move-
ment, see id. at 46-50.
13 The heart of the Wagner Act, section 7, provides that "[e]mployees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Wagner Act
§ 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
14 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
15 See DENHOLM, supra note 8, at 20.
16 See id.
17 See id. at 24. However, private sector unions still comprise a significant portion of
the private sector work force. SeeJOHN PATRICK PISKULICH, CoLLECrIVE BARGAINING IN STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 1 (1992).
18 SeeJane Giacobbe, Factfinding and Arbitration: ProceduralJusticeforAll?, in STRATEGIES
FOR IMPASSE RESOLUTION 87 (Harry Kershen & Claire Meirowitz eds., 1992); see also E. ED-
wARD HERMAN & ALFRED KUHN, COLLECFIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR RELATIONS 85 (1981)
("The growth in overall employment has been accompanied, if not exceeded, by a con-
comitant growth in union membership in the public sector.").
19 See DENHOLM, supra note 8, at 24. However, the percentage of public sector em-
ployees who belong to unions has fallen in the past twenty years from its high in 1976 of
39.8%. See id. at 27.
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Given its current prominence in labor relations, it is somewhat
surprising that public sector bargaining at the state-and local levels
did not commence until the middle part of this century, even at a
rudimentary and sporadic level.20 Extensive bargaining in the public
sector is an even more recent development 2 In 1959, Wisconsin be-
came the first state to pass a statute mandating compulsory collective
bargaining for state public sector employees. 22 In the federal sector,
the first action spurring extensive public sector bargaining in the fed-
eral government occurred in 1962, when President Kennedy issued
Executive Order 10,988.23 President Kennedy's order granted federal
employees the right "to form, join, and assist any employee
organization." 24
Although the union movement in education began as early as
1857,25 collective bargaining for teachers did not begin until the
1940s.2 6 In 1962, a New York City teachers' strike signaled the begin-
ning of the modern era of collective bargaining for teachers, marking
20 See HERMAN & KUHN, supra note 18, at 86 (Philadelphia employees have had labor
agreements since 1939; Cincinnati employees "have enjoyed de facto [union] recognition
since 1951"; the mayor of NewYork City promoted collective bargaining for city employees
in 1958); see also LEAP, supra note 8, at 635-37 (giving an overview of the development of
unionism in the public sector); PISKUUCH, supra note 17, at 29-31 (summarizing the early
history of public sector unionism in federal, state, and local governments).
21 See PIsmULcH, supra note 17, at 107; see also William L. Sharp, Collective Negotiations:
An Historical Perspective 21 J. CoLuEcrrvE NEGOTIATIONS PUB. SECTOR 231, 231 (1992) (not-
ing that collective bargaining in the public sector did not begin until it was well established
in the private sector).
22 See DENHOLM, supra note 8, at 8. Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Michigan, in
1965, and Rhode Island, in 1966, were the first states to follow Wisconsin's lead. See Sharp,
supra note 21, at 235.
23 Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963), revoked by Exec. Order 11,491, 3
C.F.R. 861 (1966-1970), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (1994).
24 Id. at 521; see also HERMAN & KUHN, supra note 18, at 91 ("The development and
implementation of this order undoubtedly provided the biggest single impetus to the
growth of unionization in the federal sector."); PIsKuLcH, supra note 17, at 31 ("EO 10988
appears to have been a watershed event in the public sector labor movement .... For the
first time federal employees were provided with the protected right to join, or to refrain
from joining, a labor organization.") (citation omitted).
Unionism among some federal employees actually began in the nineteenth century,
though various measures hampered these efforts until President Kennedy's Executive Or-
der 10,988. See id. at 29-31. President Nixon's Executive Order 11,491 expanded Executive
Order 10,988 by providing for exclusive recognition for employee organizations. Exec.
Order 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 861 (1966-1970), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (1994). See
HERMAN & KUHN, supra note 18, at 91. Currently, federal sector employees have statutory
rights to join a labor organization and to bargain collectively. See 5 U.S.C. § 7102 (1994).
25 See CHARLES R. PERRY & WEsLEY A. WILDmAN, THE IMPACr OF NEGoTrATiONs rN PUB-
Lic EDUCATION: THE EVIDENCE FROM THE ScHooLs 3 (1970). For a more comprehensive
discussion of the early history of unionism in education, see id. at 3-13.
26 See id. at 9 (citing, as examples, a Norwalk, Connecticut teachers' association that
achieved formal recognition as a bargaining agent and a teachers' union in Pawtucket,
Rhode Island that used a strike to "force[ ] the board of education to negotiate on its
proposal for salary increases").
19971
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the time when collective agreements between teachers' unions and
school districts began in earnest.27 By 1970, twenty-three states had
statutes governing some form of negotiation for either teachers or
public employees generally.28 Today, thirty-six states and the District
of Columbia have statutes allowing and governing collective bargain-
ing for at least some public employees.2 9 Of these thirty-seven juris-
dictions, fourteen have statutes applicable only to public school
employees.8 0 As a consequence of the large number of states' authori-
zation of bargaining for teachers by the mid-1980s, collective bargain-
ing for teachers had become widespread, covering 86% of the nation's
public school teachers.3' By that time, almost two million teachers
belonged to either the National Education Association ("NEA") or the
American Federation of Teachers,32 the two major teachers' unions.
Because of their substantial numbers, teachers' unions wield a large
amount of political influence.33 The national political power of teach-
ers' unions translates into a strong teachers' union presence in some
local school districts.3 4 Concomitantly, as teachers' national political
27 See KERCHNER & MITCHELL, supra note 12, at 2 (calling the strike "a permanent
change in the relationship between teachers and their school district employers"); DAVID
SELDEN, THE TEACHER REBELLION 67-77 (1985) (documenting the 1961 election by New
York City teachers of the United Federation of Teachers as their exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative and the negotiations leading to a strike-ending settlement in 1962).
28 See PERRY & WILDMAN, supra note 25, at 56.
29 See Karl D. Magnusen & Patricia A. Renovitch, Dispute Resolution in lorida's Public
Sector:. Insight into Impasse, in STRATEGIES FOR IMPASSE RESOLUTION, supra note 18, at 29, 30
(providing a table of states with collective bargaining legislation for public employees).
30 The states are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Maryland, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington.
See PUBLIC EMPLOYEES BARGAIN FOR EXCELLENCE: A COMPENDIUM OF STATE PUBLIC SECTOR
LABOR RELATIONS LAWs 10, 12-13, 18-20, 23, 27, 39-40, 45-46, 49-50 (Krista Schneider ed.,
1993). While thirty-seven jurisdictions have bargaining for some public sector employees,
two of those (Kentucky and Wyoming) do not include teachers; thus, only thirty-four states
and the District of Columbia have statutorily authorized collective bargaining for teachers.
See id. at 23-24, 54.
31 See Myron Lieberman, Educational Reform and TeacherBargaining, GOV'T UNION REv.,
Winter 1984, at 54, 56.
32 See KERCHNER & MITCHELL, supra note 12, at 12.
33 See Raymond L. Hogler & MaryJ. Thompson, Collective Negotiations in Education and
the Public Interest: A Proposed Method of Impasse Resolution, 14J.L. & EDUC. 443, 453-54 (1985)
(summarizing teachers' political activities); Lieberman, supra note 31, at 58 (arguing that
"[teacher unions ... have more power than private sector unions to block changes op-
posed by the union); David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bar-
gaining by Professional Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689, 690 (1990) (finding that "some analysts
view professional employees as a primary hope for the future of the American labor move-
ment"). See generally MAURICE R. BERUBE, TEACHER POLITICS: THE INFLUENCE OF UNIONS
(1988) (arguing that teacher unions have become the most powerful political constituency
in education).
34 See Hogler & Thompson, supra note 33, at 449 (noting that teachers' use of political
power has drawn criticism because they dominate political distribution of resources, favor-
ing their own needs over the needs of other groups); James A. Vomberg & Michael S.
Paschall, Secondary Public School Teachers' Satisfaction with Collective Bargaining, 13 J. CoLi c-
200 [Vol. 83:194
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power grew, so did local unions' influence in negotiations. As the
next section reveals, the interaction between school boards and teach-
ers in negotiations produces the post-expiration step increase issue.
B. How the Salary Step Increase Issue Arises
A school board and a teachers' bargaining representative some-
times negotiate successfully, reaching a settlement for a new collective
agreement before or shortly after the previous agreement expires.
35
However, school boards and teachers' unions frequently fail to reach
agreement so readily.3 6 Several reasons exist for this outcome. First,
the negotiations for a new agreement involve a third party absent in
private sector negotiations: the voting public.37 Given the direct pub-
lic interest in the negotiations, the process becomes a political one.3
8
Because the school board acts as the representative for the commu-
TIV NEGOTIATIONS PUB. SECTOR 85, 86 (1984) (stating that lower salaries, among other
factors, have "caused teachers to voice problems and demands to school boards").
35 See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE COMM'N ON EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, MINN. LEGISLATURE, PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE CoLLEcTrIvE BARGAINING: USE OF INTEREST ARBITRATION 2 (1995) (finding that in
Minnesota, parties settle about one-half of public employee bargaining agreements without
outside intervention, and only limited labor strife exists in the current collective bargain-
ing system).
36 See DENHOLM, supra note 8, at 1 ("Public sector collective bargaining ... in the
1990s is a failure."); LEAP, supra note 8, at 645 ("It is not unusual for contract talks involv-
ing state and local employees to extend well beyond the expiration date of the preceding
contract."); D.S. Chauhan, Managing Public Labor Disputes: Conflict Resolution in Collective
Bargaining, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS 183, 189 (Jack Rabin et al.
eds., 1994) (recognizing that it is not unusual for labor or management to reach impasse
on an issue due, in large part, to the highly sensitive political environment surrounding
public sector negotiations).
37 See Davis, supra note 5, at 109 (noting that in the public sector courts must consider
the "public's interest in efficient public services and an effective voice in the political deci-
sion-making process"). The public's influence can be significant, if not controlling, in a
dispute.
Even when the threat of bankruptcy is not imminent, state and city elected
officials.., have faced tax-payer revolts and pressures lo cut costs and im-
prove the productivity .... As a result, public officials have been forced to
operate on a more economical and efficient basis; negotiators representing
state and municipal governments have begun to take a more hard-line,
take-it-or-leave-it stance toward the bargaining demands of public-sector
unions.
LEAP, supra note 8, at 648.
38 See PISKULIcH, supra note 17, at 6.
Collective bargaining in the public sector can be considered less an
economic relationship than a manifestly political interaction. The wage-em-
ployment trade-off changes character to the extent that most governmental
activity is monopolistic in nature ....
While there will be some situations in which a fear of unemployment
restrains the willingness of public employees to exert upward pressure on
wages, political considerations are likely to play a mitigating role.
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nity, fiscal39 and political pressures compel the board to have a budget
that will not lead to increased taxes. 40 Coupled with this pressure is
the fact that teachers' salaries can consume seventy to eighty percent
of a district's budget for the year.41 Thus, teachers' salaries in a CBA
become the most important aspect in a school board's budget and the
most controversial issue in negotiations. 42 While taxpayers will fre-
39 See NATIONAL EDUC. ASS'N, NEGOTIATING CHANGE: EDUCATION REFORM AND COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING 5 (1992) (noting increased societal pressures on schools when education
funding is decreasing in many locales); id. at 34-35 (pointing out that "[d]espite the over-
whelming public concern for education," local budgets are strained creating "virtually in-
soluble dilemmas for bargainers"). As early as 1970, the primary determinant of the level
of teacher compensation was the district's ability, rather than desire, to pay. See PERRY &
WILD.MAN, supra note 25, at 139.
40 Since labor costs comprise as much as 70 percent of local expenditures, any
increase is quite visible and will be felt by elected officials and by the gen-
eral public. Both therefore have [a] strong incentive to resist this upward
pressure, even in the short run.
... [Tihe public employer is indeed trapped in a fiscal bind. Not only
do subnational public administrators face the reality of diminished inter-
governmental assistance, but they are assaulted from all sides, "caught be-
tween employee compensation demands, public willingness to vote for
increased operating levies, shrinking tax bases, opposition interests, and
the legislatures' reluctance to allow governments the freedom to impose
any kind of tax[ ] at will." The result unions face a harried employer with
strong incentive to take a rigorous bargaining stance. It is a much tougher
battle at the negotiating table.
PiSKULCH, supra note 17, at 9-10 (quoting Chimezie AKB. Osigweh, Collective Bargaining and
Public Sector Union Power, 14 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 75, 80 (1985)); see also Richard C.
Kearney, Monetary Impacts of Collective Bargaining, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC SEcrOR LABOR
RELATIONS, supra note 36, at 73, 74 ("In government, where price increases often translate
into tax and fee hikes, the choices are more confined, more difficult, and certainly more
visible to the relevant public"); id. at 89-90 (noting that the same fiscal problems and polit-
ical pressures also constrain union demands because "[t]axpayers fiercely resist what they
perceive to be excessive public employee wage and benefit settlements, especially when
they are immediately translated into tax hikes").
41 See Kearney, supra note 40, at 74 (stating that between 50% and 75% of typical state
and local budgets are dedicated to employee pay and benefits); Lieberman, supra note 31,
at 56 (noting 50% to 75% of local operating revenues go to teachers salaries and benefits);
Neal, supra note 9, at 94 (recognizing that personnel costs constitute 80% of most govern-
ment agency budgets (including school districts)); see also LEAP, supra note 8, at 646-47
(noting that because public sector jobs are "labor intensive," a "large portion" of these
operating budgets are spent on personnel, causing even a small salary increase to have a
significant budgetary effect).
42 See PERRY & WILDMAN, supra note 25, at 120 ("The advent of collective bargaining in
a school system... may accentuate ... the central position of salaries in teacher-manage-
ment relations. The basic salary schedule was... the only issue to become the focus of
significant overt conflict in new bargaining relationships."); id. at 128 ("[S]alaries appear
to occupy the same salient position in collective negotiations in public education as do
wages in collective bargaining in the private sector."); id. at 137 ("Basic salaries were the
most consistent source of overt conflict between teacher organizations and school manage-
ment in the systems studied."); id. at 154 ("[T]he establishment of a formal collective bar-
gaining relationship produced an intensification of conflict between teachers and school
management over the structure of compensation."); see also Stanley Cherim, Bargaining
from Both Sides, GOV'T UNION REv., Winter 1984, at 47, 52 (stating that the money issue is
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quently resist paying salary step increases to teachers,43 the teachers,
like any other employees, desire higher salaries.44 These clashing in-
terests lead to situations where collective agreements in education can
take months, or even years, to complete,45 and the process can be
quite adversarial. 46 As a result, teachers frequently begin a new school
year without a settled collective agreement.47
When an agreement expires, teachers usually continue to teach,
and the district continues to pay them.48 The problem arises in deter-
mining the rate of pay. Most collective agreements provide for auto-
matic step increases (raises based upon experience or length of
service) for teachers upon their completion of each year of service.49
When the agreement expires, does that provision still apply? For a
school board that wants to pay step increases even after expiration,
the situation presents both a challenge for justification to taxpayers
and a struggle for alignment with taxpayers' fiscal interests.50 Taxpay-
ers will wonder why the board should have to pay salary amounts to
which it seemingly has not yet agreed.
In confronting these questions, political pressures can force
school boards to resist teachers' demands, 51 or reinforce their efforts
the hardest part of an agreement and people are willing to risk a strike or lockout even
over small amounts).
43 See May, supra note 10, at 755-56.
44 See Kaye McDonald Sunderland, Comment, No Easy Answers: Obstades to Collaborative
Bargaining in Teacher Negotiations, 24 WiLAmrrE L. REV. 767, 772 (1988) (noting that in
addition to an interest in high-quality education, teachers' interests include receiving bet-
ter salaries).
45 See LEGISLATIVE COMM'N ON EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, MINN. LEGIsLATuRE, supra note
35, at 2 ("The arbitration process does not begin until negotiations reach impasse, which
on average is seven months after the old contract has expired. It generally takes another
seven months to complete the process once it is begun."); LEAP, supra note 8, at 645 ("It is
not unusual for contract talks involving state and local employees to extend well beyond
the expiration date of the preceding contract."); May, supra note 10, at 762 (noting that, in
one instance, contract negotiations "had dragged on unsuccessfully for over a year").
46 See Sunderland, supra note 44, at 768 (noting that despite interest in more collabo-
rative bargaining, "confrontation appears to be the growing trend"); see id. at 777-81 (trac-
ing the adversarial model in labor relations to the NLRA).
47 See Lieberman, supra note 31, at 59-60 (explaining that factfinding alone often
takes over a year).
48 See Joseph R. Weeks, Continuing Liability Under Expired Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments (pt. 1) , 15 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 5, 181 (1990) (highlighting that employees will
continue to work even when the collective agreement has expired).
49 See May, supra note 10, at 756 n.10 ("Multi-year collective bargaining agreements
(CBAs) typically contain language stating that for each extra year of teaching experience,
the teacher shall advance vertically one experiential step on the step scale.").
50 See id. at 754-56; see also Hugh D. Jascourt, Public Referendum, Is It an Effective Mecha-
nismfor Resolving Collective BargainingImpasses? An Introduction, 14J.L. & EDuC. 439, 43941
(1985) (recognizing a concern that collective negotiations bypass the will of the public
because negotiations are largely a private process between the board and the union).
51 See Vornberg & Paschall, supra note 34, at 86 (noting that as school boards try to
contain budgets and taxes they are less likely to accept teacher demands, causing teachers
to become more dissatisfied with their jobs).
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to oppose the payment of automatic raises which the expired collec-
tive agreement contains. 52 In addition, many citizens do not want to
pay increases to teachers because they often view public schools and
teachers as mediocre and, therefore, undeserving of greater expendi-
tures. 53 Further, for years, many school boards have had declining
funds with which to settle contract disputes.54 At the same time,
teachers resist working for another year at the same rate of pay, be-
cause when the cost of living is taken into account, it amounts to a pay
cut in real dollars.55 Consequently, disagreement, resentment, and
sometimes litigation over step increases can further polarize an al-
ready adversarial process,56 and lengthen an already protracted nego-
52 See Thomas A. Kochan, How to Improve the Collective BargainingProcess, in CENTER FOR
THE STUDY OF CoLLEcrIVE BARGAINING IN EDUC., PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE ON THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON THE QUALrrY OF EDUCATION TODAY,
DECEMBER 2-4, 1979, at 107, 108 (Jacqueline A. Young ed., 1979) [hereinafter
PROCEEDINGS].
Management is now [in 1979] beginning to take the offensive in collec-
tive bargaining much more aggressively than it has in the past, is beginning
to try to get things out of contracts, and pressing more of its own issues at
the bargaining table with more professional know-how and with much
more vigor. Management representatives can do so now because they have
more politicians and more of the community behind them.
Id.
53 See BERUBE, supra note 33, at 11-13 (discussing public disenchantment with teachers
after teachers entered politics, but noting that "[t]he public appears sympathetic to the
teachers' plight"); SELDEN, supra note 27, at 235-37 (noting a "backlash" of negative senti-
ment by school boards and the public in response to teacher rebellions and strikes).
The National Commission on Excellence in Education produced a report in 1983
entitled A Nation at Risk. The Imperative for Educational Reform, which caused some negative
feelings toward teachers. See id. at 241-42 (noting that "It] he underlying assumption of the
report was that the faults of American education could be corrected if teachers and policy
makers only wanted to do it").
The notion of teacher unionism itself has contributed to a negative image of teachers,
even from the very beginning of teacher unions earlier in this century. See SUSAN MOORE
JOHNSON, TEACHER UNIONS IN SCHOOLS 3 (1984) (noting that critics of teacher unions ar-
gue that unions are "laying waste" to schools); KERCHNER & MITCHELL, supra note 12, at 57-
58 (discussing early negative reactions to teacher unionism).
54 SeeJOHNSON, supra note 53, at 13-14 (discussing declining revenues as one of sev-
eral factors that influences teacher bargaining); Fred G. Burke, TheEducationalEnvironment
in the 1980"s, in CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUC., COLLECIGVE
BARGAINING IN EDUCATION IN TIMES OF FISCAL AusrERITY AND DECUNING ENROLLMENTS 1
(Mark Gray et al. eds., 1981) (discussing limited resources and increasing competition and
their anticipated impact on collective bargaining).
55 For example, assuming an inflation rate of 5%, a teacher who earns $25,000 per
year must earn $26,250 in the following year to maintain the same standard of living. If
that teacher receives the same salary in the following year (after denial of a step increase),
her real wages have fallen.
56 See DENHOLM, supra note 8, at 9 (arguing that "[c] ompulsory collective bargaining
is destructive of a peaceful, stable employer-employee relationship"); Cherim, supra note
42, at 48 (calling collective negotiation "an adversarial system of conflict resolution" which
"divide[s people] into two camps"); Paul F. Gerhart, Maintenance of the Union-Management
Relationship, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS, supra note 36, at 97, 101
(finding that in the past thirty years, labor-management relations in the public sector have
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tiation.57 To avoid this situation, and to maintain the parties' existing
relationship during negotiations, each state should have a rule, al-
lowing limited and defined exceptions, that preserves all terms and
conditions of employment after expiration, until the completion of a
new CBA.58 All terms and conditions pertaining to compensation,
such as the salary schedule and any step increase provisions in the
CBA, must survive. The formulation of such a rule rests legally on an
interpretation of the judicially constructed status quo doctrine. The
next section explores the development of this doctrine.
C. Development of Applicable Legal Doctrine
1. NLRB v. Katz59 and the Katz Doctrine
In 1962, the United States Supreme Court held in NURB v. Katz
that a "unilateral change in conditions of employment under negotia-
tion is... a violation of [the good faith bargaining provision of the
National Labor Relations Act]. 60 In Katz, the employer and union
were negotiating their initial collective agreement, 61 when the em-
ployer made unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of em-
ployment that governed their existing relationship.62 Specifically, the
employer changed the sick leave policy and awarded both wage in-
creases and merit raises. 63 To prevent the employer from making
such changes, the Supreme Court adopted a rule barring an employer
from making unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employ-
ment during negotiations until the parties reach impasse. 64 The
evolved toward an adversarial model); Ruth Tallakson & Hoyt N. Wheeler, Winning and
Losing in Interest Arbitration, in STRATEGIES FOR IMPASSE RESOLUTION, supra note 18, at 180,
180 ("Although it is true that collective bargaining often has a strong flavor of cooperative-
ness, there has also been an enduring emphasis upon winning and losing.").
57 See Richard H. deLone, Quality Education, Collective Bargaining and Social Equity, in
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 52, at 11, 11 ("[Collective bargaining in most school systems
takes up an enormous amount of the time, energy, thought,, and concern of most every-
body involved.").
58 For a discussion of the funding of such an arrangement, see infra Part III.E.1.
59 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
60 Ia at 743. For a good summary of Katz and its implications for the private sector,
see W. Gary Vause, The Good Faith Obligation in Public Sector Bargaining-Uses and Limits of the
Private Sector Mode4 19 STETSON L. REv. 511, 54143 (1990).
61 Katz, 369 U.S. at 739-40.
62 IM at 741.
63 See id. at 744 (sick leave), 744-45 (wage increases), 745-46 (merit increases).
64 Id. at 74243. It is important to draw a distinction betveen impasse in the public
sector versus the private sector. In the private sector, parties reach impasse once no
chance remains that further negotiation will produce an agreement. In the public sector,
impasse is reached later in the process. Once parties in the public sector cannot reach an
agreement, they typically proceed through a series of impasse procedures including media-
tion, fact-finding, and sometimes, arbitration. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3548-3548.8
(West 1995); 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12 (West 1993); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 150E, § 9
(Law. Co-op. 1989). If the parties complete these procedures without reaching an agree-
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Court explained that the implementation of unilateral changes consti-
tuted "a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which frustrates the
objectives of [the requirement to bargain in good faith] much as does
a flat refusal."
65
2. Scope of the Katz Doctrine
Because Supreme Court opinions cannot foresee all future vari-
ables or cover all situations, courts must determine the scope of
Supreme Court holdings as they apply them to new fact patterns and
circumstances. The salary step increase issue for teachers differs from
the issue in Katz in three important respects. First, because Katz in-
volves the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), it is a private
sector case that does not apply to public sector employees, and is not
mandatory authority in public sector relations. 66 More explicitly, the
NLRA, which created the NLRB,67 excludes public employers from
coverage under the Act.68 Therefore, the NLRB has no jurisdiction to
decide cases involving public sector (government) employers, and
hence, cases that public employees bring against their employers.
Therefore, like Katz, any NLRB case before the Supreme Court will
not bind public employers. Second, the employer in Katz made uni-
lateral changes before the parties reached an agreement at the begin-
ning of their labor relationship.69 In the post-expiration setting,
however, the disputes in question occur after a collective agreement
expires. Finally, Katz sought to increase, not decrease or freeze, the
employees' wages. Thus, the question is: Will the Katz doctrine apply
when a public employer refuses to grant a wage increase after agree-
ment expiration? The following two subsections explain the courts'
affirmative answer to this question.
a. Adopting Katz in the Public Sector
Many states that authorize collective bargaining for teachers and
other public sector employees have cited Katz or applied its rule to
ment, they have reached impasse and the employer could theoretically make unilateral
changes pursuant to the Katz rule.
65 Katz, 369 U.S. at 743.
66 See NLRA § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1994) (excluding from the definition of"em-
ployer" under the Act "any State or political subdivision thereof"); see also Vause, supra note
60, at 512 (noting that although the NLRA exempts public employees from its scope, the
Act has been the model for most public bargaining statutes).
67 NLRA §§ 3-6, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-156.
68 See supra note 66. Municipalities and counties, both of which employ teachers, are
political subdivisions of a state. Therefore, the NLRA does not govern their actions as
employers.
69 Katz, 369 U.S. at 739-41.
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labor relations in the public sector.70 This development may be some-
what surprising, given the dissimilarities between the sectors.71 The
differences between the public and private sectors are such that some
commentators doubt whether collective bargaining and education, or
bargaining and the public sector generally, are compatible at all.7
2
Three differences between the sectors bear most significantly on the
step increase issue: (1) the political, as opposed to economic, nature
70 See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Associated COLT Staff, 659 A.2d 842, 848 (Me. 1995)
(Wathen, C.J., dissenting) (describing "the prohibition against unilateral change [as] ...
universally recognized in collective bargaining in both the private and public sector");
Smith County Educ. Ass'n v. Anderson, 676 S.W.2d 328, 339 (Tenn. 1984) (noting that
"[c]ourts of other states have considered whether the principles set forth in Katz apply to
collective bargaining in the public sector and the majority have held that they do"); see also
Stephen F. Befort, Public Sector Bargaining: Fiscal Crisis and Unilateral Change, 69 MINN. L.
REv. 1221, 1268 (1985) ("Virtually all jurisdictions carry over to the public sector the pri-
vate sector rule extending the unilateral change proscription to the postcontract setting,
prohibiting an employer from unilaterally altering the status quo concerning mandatory
bargaining topics... without first bargaining to impasse.").
71 See DENHOLM, supra note 8, at 1 (bemoaning the failure of "[t]hose who imposed
collective bargaining on the public sector ... to appreciate the differences between the
public and private sectors"); LEAP, supra note 8, at 635 (pointing out that "the differences
between public-sector and private-sector collective bargaining are significant").
72 At least one NEA lawyer doubts whether education reform and collective bargain-
ing are compatible. See Robert Chanin, The Relationship Between Collective Bargaining and
Education Reform, in ADVANCING THE NATIONAL EDUCATION GOALs: THE ROLE OF CoLLETarrv
BARGAINING 14, 18 (National Education Association ed., 1993) (concluding, despite doubts
about collective bargaining in education, that the NEA should "resist any attempt to
weaken collective bargaining"); see also ILeberman, supra note 31, at 54 (asserting that
"public sector bargaining poses insuperable obstacles to the educational reform
movement").
Some commentators even doubt the compatibility of collective negotiations with the
entire public sector. See, e.g., Neal, supra note 9, at 91 (arguing that application of private
sector collective bargaining laws to the public sector would result in "serious damage to the
social and economic fabric of the entire nation"). But see Richard Compere, Comment,
Public Sector Collective Bargaining in Mississippi: An Argument for Acceptanc 56 Miss. LJ. 379,
390-91 (1986) ("Certainly there are distinctions between the two environments, but the
fact that the public sector is not a purely economic environment ... does not mean that
public employee bargaining is inappropriate. Analogous forces exist in the public sec-




of bargaining in the public sector;73 (2) the role of the public interest
in public sector bargaining;74 and (3) the differences in funding.75
The first two differences are closely related. The first difference
flows from the idea that "in the private sector, if a company conducts
its labor negotiations in an irresponsible manner, the company will
cease to exist. In other words, the market place is the ultimate curb to
wrong decisions in the private sector. There is no market place for
government decisions."76 Normal market pressures force private sec-
tor employers to keep their products competitive and to take stances
in labor negotiations that will keep costs down.77 However, because
government services are monopolistic, consumers have no alternatives
if the government discontinues these services. 78 When a labor dispute
or protracted negotiation jeopardizes delivery of government services,
the government employer can either refuse to deliver the services to
the public, possibly creating pressure to settle with the union, or con-
cede to the union.79 In this way, the "economic pressure for reason-
able settlement [that is present in the private sector] is less present in
the public sector, thus creating more potential for management to
give in to union demands."80 Therefore, the absence of market forces
and the presence of political pressure arguably create a weaker man-
73 See PISKULIcH, supra note 17, at 6 (stating that "[c]oflective bargaining in the public
sector can be considered less an economic relationship than a manifestly political interac-
tion"); Sherry S. Dickerson & N. Joseph Cayer, The Environmental Context of Public Labor
Relations, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS, supra note 36, at 1, 1 (discuss-
ing the political nature of public sector labor relations and the economic nature of private
sector labor relations); Neal, supra note 9, at 91 (drawing a contrast between the private
sector, "a private economic matter between producer and specific consumers," and the
public sector, "a public political matter between the government and citizens generally").
74 See HERMAN & KUHN, supra note 18, at 104 (public interest maybe present in public
sector, but is "generally absent" in the private sector); LEAP, supra note 8, at 645 (stating
that multilateral pressures, or pressures from third parties, are strongest in teacher bar-
gaining); Chauhan, supra note 36, at 186-87 (citing the influence of public interest in pub-
lic sector collective bargaining).
75 See LEAP, supra note 8, at 646-49 (describing "several unique fiscal characteristics
that set [public-sector organizations] apart from private-sector firms").




80 Id. For an alternative formulation of the problem, see DENHOLM, supra note 8, at 2-
3.
Public sector decisions are political decisions no matter how great their
economic impact .... In the public sector, decisions that are politically
popular but economically ruinous can get you reelected. Decisions that are
economically sound but politically unpopular are ruinous.
Private sector decisions are economic decisions no matter how great
their political impact. In the private sector, economic decisions that have
bad political consequences can make you unpopular, but decisions that are
politically popular and have bad economic consequences can put you out
of business.
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agement bargaining position in the public sector than in the private
sector.
The second difference between the sectors, the role of the public
interest, purportedly has similar effects in that public sector bargain-
ing increases the power of teachers' unions. In private sector bargain-
ing, the only groups with a direct interest in the results of negotiations
are the employer and the employees.8' In contrast, the taxpaying
public may represent a third party in public sector bargaining that is
absent in the private sector relationship.82 When the public employer
bargains with the public-employee union using the private sector
model, it may give public sector employees "exclusive access" to the
decisionmakers.8 3 As a result of such access, the union-a private in-
terest group-becomes a participant in the school board's legislative
process, which is a public activity.84 Thus, the union may wield im-
proper influence over the political decisions of the school board.85
The prominence of salary costs in the public sector8 6 magnifies this
problem because the bargaining relationship gives the union a larger
role in fiscal matters than that of the town's citizens.
87
The third difference, sources of financing, is easier to compre-
hend. Public employers obtain money from tax revenues collected
from residents.88 Private employers do not. Therefore, budgeting
and collective bargaining have a close relationship in the public sec-
tor. 9 The problem arises in negotiation because the union may base
81 See LEAP, supra note 8, at 645 (stating that "[p]rivate-sector labor disputes generally
do not attract a great deal of attention from persons or interest groups outside of the
corporation and union directly involved in the contract talks").
82 See Vause, supra note 60, at 566 ("The public employer is government; it acts as the
state, or at least as an arm of the state. In that capacity, it owes duties to the public that
simply do not attach to private sector employees."). Of course, one could also view the
public sector bargaining relationship as a two-party relationship in which the government
employer is not a separate interest, but rather represents the public interest. See infra notes
96-97 and accompanying text.
83 SeeJohn Pisapia, Alternatives to the Bilateral Mode4 in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 52, at
56, 57.
84 See Gary M. Smit, The Effect of Collective Bargaining on Governance in Education, GOV'T
UNION R.Ev., Winter 1984, at 28, 32.
85 See Davis, supra note 5, at 117; see also Befort, supra note 70, at 1256 (noting that
'other commentators point out that public sector bargaining limits the political access of
potentially adverse interest groups by excluding them from the bilateral negotiation pro-
cess"); Kendrick Scott, The Case Against Collective Bargaining in Public Education, GOV'T
UNION REV., Spring 1982, at 16, 21 (arguing that collective bargaining "places... power in
the hands of a vested interest group, the teachers' union," thereby diminishing other legiti-
mate interest groups' influence on the process).
86 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
87 See Neal, supra note 9, at 94; see also id. (wondering how the government employer
can serve the public interest fairly when it must "negotiate 'with only one portion of its
constituency--its employees-on matters that cover 80 percent of its budget").




its proposals on factors outside of a fixed budget, such as a cost-of-
living measurement or what other jurisdictions are paying.90 Even if
the parties reach an agreement, it may not become effective until it
receives legislative approval.91
None of these three differences should prevent adoption of pri-
vate sector labor law precedent in the public sector and courts should
apply the Katz rule prohibiting unilateral change to public sector col-
lective agreements. First, according to commentators, arguments that
public sector unions enjoy disproportionate political power are
overstated:
[T]he feared imbalance in political power is considerably exag-
gerated and... significant political constraints on public sector bar-
gaining do exist. Indeed, over the past decade taxpayers pressured
public sector managers to resist union demands in virtually every
jurisdiction. The political clout of taxpayers repeatedly dwarfed that
of public sector unions as management bargaining stances hard-
ened and wage freezes replaced cost-of-living adjustments.92
Other commentators discredit warnings about the excessive power of
teachers' unions in local negotiations because "significant political
and economic factors" limit that power.93 These factors include a lack
of political support for educators, the value of fiscal conservatives in
the budget process, and school boards' savvy in negotiations. 94
Second, the public is not altogether excluded from the negotia-
tions of CBA terms. Professor Stephen Befort argues:
The public access concerns... also appear to be overstated.... The
introduction of collective bargaining does not eliminate the access
of other groups to public officials. Although the public does not
participate directly in negotiation sessions, it still has input through
lobbying, political action committees, and elections. Most states also
require that elected legislative bodies review and approve collective
bargaining agreements. Some state statutes also contain innovative
provisions that require the parties to present their initial negotia-
tion proposals at a public forum.95
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 Befort, supra note 70, at 1260-61; see also id at 1256 (arguing that "[a]lthough avoid-
ing distortion of the democratic political process is a laudable objective, the development
of public sector labor relations during the fiscal crisis suggests that the political process
concerns have been exaggerated").
93 Michael Finch & Trevor W. Nagel, Collective Bargaining in the Public Schools: Reassess-
ing Labor Policy in an Era of Reform, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1573, 1577 (1984).
94 See id For an elaboration of this point, see id. at 1600-04; see also PISKULICH, supra
note 17, at 8 (noting that "[tlhe need to curtail excessive union influence over a shrinking
pie may be quite salable to a public uneasy about its economic future").
95 Befort, supra note 70, at 1261-62 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 1275 ("The
aggressive response of public sector management and the increasing centralization of au-
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In addition, when school boards negotiate with a teachers' union,
school board officials are the elected representatives of the public in-
terest. If a school board delegates negotiation responsibilities to some
other official, such delegation may appear to weaken the connection
between the public and the actions of its government. However,
elected officials "routinely" give responsibility to civil servants whom
the elected officials appoint.
96
Finally, public officials have more flexibility with regard to finan-
cial matters than is immediately apparent. To cover unexpected or
unbudgeted items, officials can shift funds from one purpose to an-
other and compensate for a resulting shortfall in a later appropria-
tions period.9 7 Alternatively, a school board may appeal, on behalf of
the school district, to an appropriate legislative body for additional
funds.98 Such an appeal would be especially compelling if intended to
fund payment of an item that courts or statutory provisions require.
In these ways, "the rigid and bureaucratic budgeting process that is
commonly characteristic of governmental entities does not necessarily
impose a constraint on the collective bargaining process."99
Despite the preceding concerns about the differences between
the private and public sectors, jurisdictions with public sector bargain-
ing statutes' 00 have had little or no trouble adopting the general Katz
rule in the public sector.1 1 Essentially, the rationale for the Katz rule
is the same in both sectors.' 0 2 Maintenance of the conditions underly-
ing the bargaining relationship, and thus the prevention of unilateral
changes, promotes collective bargaining. 03 Therefore, the prohibi-
thority in more publicly visible officials belie the notion that public employers cannot rep-
resent the public interest in collective bargaining.").
96 LEAP, supra note 8, at 642. Any executive branch agency of the federal government
serves as an apt example.
97 See id- at 647 ("[P] ublic administrators frequently have the authority to move funds
from one budgetary category to another.").
98 See id. ("Appeals may also be made to legislative bodies for additional monies to
fund wage, salary, and benefit demands.").
99 Id.
100 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
101 See infra notes 109-21 and accompanying text; see also Befort, supra note 70, at 1231-
32 (Although "it has become almost obligatory in contemporary scholarly literature to ar-
gue that the theoretical distinctions between the two sectors preclude the possibility of
transplanting private sector policies and procedures to the public sector", the "theoretical
distinctions have become obsolete.") (footnote omitted).
102 Compare NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962) (a private sector case holding that
a "unilateral change in conditions of employment under negotiation" is a violation of the
duty to bargain in good faith because it circumvents the duty to negotiate), with Vienna
Sch. Dist. No. 55 v. Illinois Educ. Labor Rel. Bd., 515 N.E.2d 476, 478 (IIl. App. Ct. 1987) (a
public sector case citing Katz and its reasoning to support the same rule in the public
sector).
103 See Katz, 369 U.S. at 744 (finding that one of the unilateral changes in the case




tion of unilateral changes falls within the policy objectives of both the
NLRA and state public sector labor laws.' 0 4 Thus, when employers
impose unilateral changes to collective agreements in the public sec-
tor, it undercuts the bargaining process much as it does in the private
sector.'0 5 One reason for public sector labor law's adoption of the
Katz rule prohibiting unilateral change is that most states have based
their public sector labor statutes on the NLRA,10 6 which governed the
Supreme Court's Katz decision.
10 7
Perhaps realizing such similarities, at least several states have
cited Katz when importing its prohibition of unilateral change during
negotiation. 108 The first case to address the subject of post-expiration
unilateral change in the public sector was Triborough Bridge & Tunnel
Authority10 9 in New York. In Triborough, the employer maintained sal-
ary levels on the date of contract expiration, thereby failing to grant
salary increases during negotiations." 0 The New York Public Employ-
104 See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994) ("It is declared hereby
to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstruc-
tions to the free flow of commerce ... by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining. . . ."); Katz, 369 U.S. at 747 (reasoning that unilateral actions an
employer takes that affect conditions of employment without negotiation "must of neces-
sity obstruct bargaining, contrary to the congressional policy"). For analogous state policy,
see, for example, HAw. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 89-1 (Michie 1996) (declaring that "harmonious
and cooperative relations between government and its employees.., are best effectuated
by (1) recognizing the right of public employees to organize for the purpose of collective
bargaining, (2) requiring the public employers to negotiate with and enter into written
agreements with exclusive representatives"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.1 (West 1995) ("The
general assembly declares that it is the public policy of the state to promote harmonious
and cooperative relationships between government and its employees by permitting public
employees to organize and bargain collectively....").
105 See Galloway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Galloway Township Educ. Ass'n, 393 A.2d
218, 230 (NJ. 1978) (pointing out that, like Katz in the private sector, the state legislature
of New Jersey "has... recognized that the unilateral imposition of working conditions is
the antithesis of its goal that the terms and conditions of public employment be established
through bilateral negotiation") (emphasis added).
106 See DENHOLM, supra note 8, at 1 (realizing that despite the differences between the
sectors, "the [NLRA] ... has been used as a model for all public sector bargaining laws,
with minor variation"); LEAP, supra note 8, at 654 ("State and municipal bargaining statutes
are often similar in content to the [NLRA]."); Finch & Nagel, supra note 94, at 1581 (stat-
ing that "[t]eacher bargaining laws have usually been patterned after private sector prece-
dent, particularly the [NLRA]"); Rabban, supra note 33, at 692 (noting that public sector
labor legislation "incorporates many doctrines from the NLRA model"); Vause, supra note
60, at 512 (calling the NLRA "the most enduring model for structuring the new public
sector bargaining statutes"); see also Befort, supra note 70, at 1231-32 (declaring that as
public sector labor relations has taken on attributes of private sector relations, the "theo-
retical distinctions [between the two] have become obsolete").
107 For a discussion of the decision, see supra Parts I.C.1-2.
108 The states discussed here are California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Tennessee. See infra notes
110-21 and accompanying text.
109 5 N.Y. Pub. Employment Rel. Bd. Rep. (Labor Rel. Press) 3037, at 3064 (N.Y.
Pub. Employment Rel. Bd. July 28, 1972).
110 I& at 3064.
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ment Relations Board ("PERB") held that the employer's action vio-
lated the duty to bargain, and thus adopted the private sector rule
prohibiting unilateral change after expiration."' In an opinion fre-
quently cited by other states, 112 NewJersey later followed New York in
Galloway Township Board of Education v. Galloway Township Education
Ass'n.113 The Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized the similarity
of this private sector rule to its own statutory public sector bargaining
statute. 114 The court also explicitly used the analysis in Katz to sup-
port its analysis of this public sector case."15 New Jersey recently af-
firmed its rule in Evesham Township Board of Education.116 Noting that
New Jersey had imported the Katz rule to the public sector, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee did the same in Smith County Education
Ass'n v. Anderson.117 Four other states, California, Oregon, Illinois,
and Massachusetts, have relied on Katz and their state's own public
sector labor statutes in adopting the general rule of Katz.118 Without
citing Katz explicitly, Florida, Maine, and New Hampshire have
adopted its prohibition of employer-imposed unilateral changes dur-
ing negotiations. 119 Finally, Indiana has codified the Katz rule
preventing unilateral changes.
120
111 Id at 3064-65. For a discussion of Triborougl's impact in the public sector, see
Befort, supra note 70, at 1268-74.
112 See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
113 393 A.2d 218 (N.J. 1978).
114 Id at 230.
115 Id. at 231.
116 [Transfer Binder 21] NJ. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 26001, at 3 (N.J.
Pub. Employment Rel. Comm'n Oct. 28, 1994).
117 676 S.W.2d 328 (Tenn. 1984); see id. at 338-39 (citing Katz and discussing New
Jersey's application of it).
118 See Vienna Sch. Dist. No. 55 v. Illinois Educ. Labor Rel. Bd., 515 N.E.2d 476, 478
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (citing and discussing Katz and Galloway in deciding a salary increment
issue); Davis Unified Sch. Dist., [Transfer Binder 4] Cal. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel.
Press) 11031, at 121, 124 (Cal. Pub. Employment Rel. Bd. Feb. 22, 1980) (citing Katz to
construe the requirement of bargaining in good faith in the context of unilaterally failing
to pay step increases after expiration); Town of Chatham, 21 Mass. Lab. Rel. Rep. (New
England Legal Pub.) 1526, 1529 (Mass. Lab. Rel. Comm'n Jan. 5, 1995) (citing Katz, in
addition to state precedent, as authority for its unilateral change rule); Portland Commu-
nity College, 9 Pub. Employer Collective Bargaining Rep. (Lab. Law Pub.) 9018, 9022-28
(Or. Employment Rel. Bd. Sept. 1986) (citing and discussing (1) the similarity of a provi-
sion of Oregon's Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act to the NLRA provision at issue
in Katz, (2) the Katz decision, and (3) New Jersey's use of the Katz decision in Galloway).
119 SeeBoard of Trustees v. Associated COLT Staff, 659 A.2d 842, 844-45 (Me. 1995); In
re Milton Sch. Dist., 625 A.2d 1056, 1060 (N.H. 1993); Nassau County Sch. Bd., [Transfer
Binder 8] Fla. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 13206, at 390, 395 (Fla. Pub. Em-
ployment Rel. Comm'n Apr. 30, 1982).
120 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-7.5-1-12(e) (Michie 1992); see also Indiana Educ. Employment
Rel. Bd. v. Mill Creek Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 456 N.E.2d 709, 711 (Ind. 1983) (citing
and discussing the statute).
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b. Applying Katz to Expired Collective Agreements and Wage
Increase Denials
In addition to applying the Katz rationale in the public sector,
courts have solved the problem of Katz's application to expired agree-
ments and wage increase denials. First Katz involved the imposition of
changes during the negotiation of an initial CBA, so a question of
Katz's application arises where the employer makes unilateral changes
after a previous agreement expires. In Litton Financial Printing Division
v. NLRB,' 2' the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he Katz doctrine has
been extended.., to cases where... an existing agreement has ex-
pired and negotiations on a new one have yet to be completed."'
122
Second, Katz involved an increase in wages, undercutting the union's
authority and strength by essentially excluding the union from the
bargaining process.123 Arguably, a wage freeze or denial of a sched-
uled increase would not undercut the union's position in the work-
place. Rather, a wage reduction by the employer would probably
galvanize union strength and support. Nevertheless, courts find de-
nial of an increase to be a violation of the NLRA as well. For example,
in NLRB v. Allied Products Corp.,12 4 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that "[t]he Act is violated by a unilateral change in the existing
wage structure whether that change be an increase or the denial of a
scheduled increase." 125 Although courts have resolved these two par-
ticular ambiguities that the Katz opinion created, courts and litigants
still vigorously debate what compliance with the Katz rule requires.
126
3. The Meaning of "Status Quo": the Static and Dynamic Status
Quo Debate
While most of the states agree on the appropriateness of adopt-
ing the terms of the Katz rule for public sector employees, 127 the diffi-
culty arises in applying the Katz rule. Critics point out that it is
difficult for courts to determine what are "'changes"' in "'terms and
conditions of employment"' prior to "'impasse"' when applying the
Katz rule.'28 In addition, employees usually continue to work after a
121 501 U.S. 190 (1991).
122 Id. at 198.
123 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743, 744, 747 (1962).
124 548 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1977).
125 Id. at 653; see also NLRB v. Dothan Eagle, Inc., 434 F.2d 93, 98 (5th Cir. 1970)
("[W]henever the employer by promises or by a course of conduct has made a particular
benefit part of the established wage or compensation system, then he is not at liberty uni-
laterally to change this benefit either for better or worse during... the period of collective
bargaining.").
126 See infra Parts II.D-F.
127 See supra text accompanying notes 100-20.
128 Joseph R. Weeks, Continuing Liability Under Expired Collective Bargaining Agreements
(pts. 2 & 3), 15 OKLA. CiTy U. L. Rzv. 359, 590-91 (1990); see also id (criticizing the Katz
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collective agreement expires, but the contract, and hence its terms,
have literally expired, creating a question as to what terms govern em-
ployment after expiration of the agreement. 129 In attempting to solve
this problem by applying the Katz rule, the states have arrived at differ-
ent interpretations of the meaning of refraining from unilateral
changes, or maintaining the status quo, during negotiations for a new
collective agreement. 130
Courts developed the "status quo" doctrine from the Katz prohi-
bition of unilateral changes. 13' This doctrine requires employers "to
maintain, during the period of negotiations, the status quo concern-
ing conditions of employment in order to avoid committing a [viola-
tion of the duty to bargain in good faith] ."132 Intuitively, the answer
to the question about the meaning of "status quo" seems easy: the
term "status quo" indicates that terms and conditions of employment
should remain the same until impasse. For example, after expiration
of the agreement, an employee's wages, hours, and health benefits
should remain at pre-expiration levels. Unfortunately, courts have
not been able to ascertain the meaning of "status quo" easily. For
example, many collective agreements include, as a term of the em-
ployment agreement, automatic annual or periodic salary or wage in-
creases based upon length of service.' 33 After a collective agreement
expires, two approaches to salary provisions are possible. First, main-
tenance of the status quo could require that salary levels remain the
same.'34 Second, status quo protection might also include the exten-
sion of automatic raises beyond the life of the agreement because
those raises are a term or condition of employment.135
rule as "incapable of being consistently understood and complied with"); id at 600 (dis-
cussing the "structural inadequacy of the Katz doctrine").
129 See Weeks, supra note 48, at 181 ("It is ...the most obvious and yet the most
frequently overlooked aspect of the postexpiration obligations... that, although the col-
lective agreement has expired, the employees will commonly continue to work. This sim-
ple fact has implications that present some of the most analytically difficult questions
offered in this context.").
130 See infra Parts II.D-F.
131 See Portland Community College, 9 Pub. Employer Collective Bargaining Rep.
(Lab. Law Pub.) 9018, 9023 (Or. Employment Rel. Bd. Sept. 1986) ("The 'status quo doc-
trine' was developed through case law in the private sector in order to apply [the Katz]
rule.").
132 Id.
133 See, e.g., Galloway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Galloway Township Educ. Ass'n, 393
A.2d 218, 231 (NJ. 1978) (noting that the Public Employment Relations Commission had
called the increments in the case "'automatic'" because commencement of another year of
service entitled the teachers to the increases); see also May, supra note 10, at 768-69 (citing a
critic of spending practices in Vermont schools as saying that "because step raises are auto-
matiG they do not function as a reward for better teaching or better student performance")
(emphasis added).
134 See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text
135 See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
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In solving this dilemma, courts have developed two doctrines: the
"static" status quo doctrine and the "dynamic" status quo doctrine.
The static status quo rule "require[s] and permit[s] public employers
to pay only those wages in effect when the agreement expired, unless
the agreement provides otherwise."' 3 6 States that do not require pay-
ment of raises follow the static status quo doctrine. Using this model,
employers freeze all contract terms, including salaries, at existing
levels.13 7 In contrast, the dynamic status quo rule "require [s] and per-
mit[s] a public employer to pay wages according to the wage plan of
the expired agreement, including any scheduled step increases."138 In
the public education setting, states that require school districts to pay
these raises use a dynamic status quo rule. This approach allows previ-
ous patterns of change during the life of an agreement, or previous
agreements, to continue past expiration.
13 9
Courts' conflicting decisions about using the static or dynamic
status quo, sometimes in conjunction with statutory interpretation,
form the legal background that this Note investigates. The next sec-
tion begins the process by surveying the states' various responses to
post-expiration salary step increases.
II
TREATENT OF POsT-ExPrRAION STEP INCREASES IN THE
FIF' STATES
Generally, three simple answers exist in response to the question
of continuation of step raises: yes, no, and no answer.140 The last of
these answers, the nonanswer, occurs in states that either expressly
prohibit collective bargaining for teachers or neither prohibit nor
grant the right to bargain.141 In addition, some states that expressly
authorize collective bargaining for teachers have no answer to this
question because either a statutory scheme prevents the situation
from arising, or the state has no judicial precedent on point.142 The
remaining answers, the affirmative and negative, turn on a state's ap-
proach to the status quo doctrine. 143 Discussion of the various an-
swers to the problem proceeds as follows: states with no answer, in
136 Board of Trustees v. Associated COLT Staff, 659 A.2d 842, 846 (Me. 1995)
(Wathen, C.J., dissenting).
137 See id. at 847 (Wathen, C.J., dissenting).
138 1& (Wathen, C.J., dissenting).
139 See id. at 845 (stating that the dynamic status quo rule requires "public employers to
pay their employees any annual step increases in wages included in an agreement that
expired").
140 For a thorough and informative survey of states' law on this subject, see May, supra
note 10, at 775-810. This Part of the Note relies significantly on Professor May's research.
141 See infta Part II.A.
142 See infra Parts II.B-C.
143 See supra Part I.C.3.
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Sections A, B, and C; states that pay step increases after expiration, in
Section D; states that, based on local practice, may or may not pay step
increases, in Section E; and states that refuse to pay step increases
after expiration, in Section F.
A. Jurisdictions Without Statutory Collective Bargaining
1. Express Prohibitions of Collective Bargaining
Five states expressly prohibit collective bargaining for teachers:
Georgia, 44 Missouri,145 North Carolina, 1
46 Texas, 147 and Virginia. 148
Obviously, because the question of survivability of terms in collective
agreements cannot arise in these states, they offer the simplest and
least interesting answer to the problem. In formulating teachers' sala-
ries, all of these states, except Virginia, set statutory minimum teacher
salaries or pay salaries out of state funds. 149 Such a solution seems
sensible, given a prohibition of bargaining. If teachers cannot protect
their interests by bargaining collectively with local boards, the state
provides protection by requiring school districts to pay a minimum
salary.
Georgia's salary scheme serves as a suitable example. 150 The
schedule, set by the State Board of Education, in some ways resembles
a typical salary schedule in a collective bargaining state. Based on ex-
perience and length of service, the schedule provides for incremental
increases above the minimum salary.151 Georgia's plan also preserves
144 GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-989.10 (1996) ("Nothing in this part shall be construed to
permit or foster collective bargaining....").
145 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.510 (West Supp. 1996) ("Employees except... all teachers of
all Missouri schools ... shall have the right to form and join labor organizations and to
present proposals to any public body relative to salaries and other conditions of employ-
ment through the representative of their own choosing."). Despite this language, de facto
bargaining has arisen in some of Missouri's school districts. See May, supra note 10, at 777.
146 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-98 (1995) (declaring agreements between municipalities and
labor organizations as bargaining agents "against the public policy of the State, illegal,
unlawful, void and of no effect").
147 TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 617.002(a) (West 1994) ("An official of the state or of a
political subdivision of the state may not enter into a collective bargaining contract with a
labor organization regarding wages, hours, or conditions of employment of public
employees.").
148 VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-57.2 (Michie 1994) ("No state, county, municipal, or like
government officer.., is vested with... any authority... to collectively bargain or enter
into any collective bargaining contract with any... union or association .... ").
149 See GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-212 (1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 163.172 (West 1991 &
Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-302(c) (Supp. 1995) (providing that "[e]very local
board of education may adopt as to teachers not paid out of State funds a salary schedule
similar to the State salary schedule... ; but if any local board of education shall fail to
adopt such a schedule, the State salary schedule shall be in force"); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 21.402 (West 1996). Virginia periodically provides funds to improve teachers' salaries.
See May, supra note 10, at 776 n.164.
150 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-2-212, -212.1, -212.2 (1996).
151 Id. § 20-2-212(a).
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some local control-local administration can supplement the mini-
mum salaries based on a variety of factors.152 To ensure fairness, the
minimum salary is not set arbitrarily; rather, the State Board of Educa-
tion bases it on the average salary for recent graduates of the Univer-
sity of Georgia System who enter positions having educational entry
requirements comparable to those for teaching.'53
2. No Express Prohibition or Authorization of Bargaining
The laws of Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyo-
ming neither prohibit nor authorize collective bargaining for teach-
ers.154 Consequently, no rule for payment of step increases upon
expiration of collective agreements exists in any of these states. The
lack of statutory law governing collective bargaining in education has
different effects in these states. In four of them, Alabama, Mississippi,
South Carolina, and West Virginia, the lack of authorization is tanta-
mount to a prohibition of collective bargaining. 55 In the other seven
states, "some form of collective bargaining occurs in contract negotia-
tion and execution in the absence of legislation requiring, allowing,
or forbidding public sector labor negotiations." 56 Because no rule
for payment of step increases exists, school boards in these states that
choose to bargain collectively with teachers are generally free to pay
or withhold step increases.157 If statutes and state precedent neither
require nor forbid bargaining or the payment of step increases, school
boards have the autonomy to govern their labor relationship with
teachers. They may choose to bargain collectively, but may also bar-
gain individually. If they decide to enter into a CBA, they may choose
to give or withhold step increases after expiration. No state authority
requires one choice or the other.
152 Id. § 20-2-212(b). These factors include "the nature of duties to be performed, the
responsibility of the position held, the subject matter or grades to be taught, and the expe-
rience and performance of the particular employee whose salary is being supplemented."
Id.
'53 Id. § 20-2-212(a).
154 See May, supra note 10, at 776-80.
155 See id. at 776 nn.155, 157, 160, & 163.
156 Id. at 777. For a discussion of bargaining practices in these seven states, see id. at
777-80. The payment of steps after expiration varies among and within these states. See id.
157 In Arizona, Arkansas, and Wyoming school boards usually do not pay step increases
after contract expiration. See id. at 778, 780. In Colorado, Louisiana, and Utah, teachers
may or may not receive step increases, depending on local practice. See id. at 779-80. In
Kentucky, those districts that do have collective bargaining must pay at least the statutorily
mandated step increases in the state's minimum salary schedule. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 157.390 (Banks-Baldwin 1995); May, supra note 10, at 779.
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B. Collective Bargaining Jurisdictions That Use Statutes to Avoid
the Problem
The remainder of the states have collective bargaining for teach-
ers, and approach expiration in various ways. Two states, Connecti-
cut1 58 and Iowa, 159 seek to avoid lapses in the coverage of collective
agreements by strictly mandating time lines for completion of new
agreements.' 60 Of the two, Connecticut's procedure is the more strin-
gent. Bargaining must begin at least two hundred ten days before the
date for submission of the annual budget.161 One hundred sixty days
before the submission of the district's annual budget, the negotiating
parties must mutually submit any settlement they have reached.
162 If
the parties have failed to settle and have not yet initiated mediation,
the parties must select a mediator and begin mediation. 163 Either
four days after the end of the mediation session, or on the one hun-
dred thirty-fifth day before budget submission, whichever is sooner,
the parties must present their settlement.'6 If the parties do not
reach a settlement, they must enter arbitration. 165 After a hearing,
which lasts a maximum of twenty-five days, the arbitrators have twenty
158 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153f (West 1996).
159 IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 20.17, 20.19 to .22 (West 1995). The Iowa scheme provides
that collective agreements "shall be complete not later than May 31 of the year when the
agreement is to become effective." Id. § 20.17.11.a. If no voluntary agreement occurs, the
parties, in performing their duty to bargain, must agree upon impasse procedures which
begin "not later than one hundred twenty days prior to May 31 of the year when the collec-
tive bargaining agreement is to become effective." Id. § 20.19. If the parties do not agree
on these impasse procedures, Iowa provides the following options: mediation and binding
arbitration. Id. §§ 20.19-.20, 20.22. The parties may submit any impasse items to binding
arbitration or "other procedures as deemed necessary to provide for the completion of
negotiations of proposed collective bargaining agreements not later than May 31." Id.
§ 20.17.11.a. Parties must select a date sufficiently in advance of May 31 to submit items for
binding arbitration to give the arbitrator(s) reasonable time to make a decision by that
date. See id. § 20.17.11.b(1).
However, this system does not provide a sure means for prevention of hiatus between
agreements. At least one of the parties must request assistance at impasse. See id §§ 20.20,
20.22. If no party requests impasse procedures, a contract could remain unsettled for an
entire year. In such a case, the employer will either "maintain[ ] the salary dollar figure
status quo or implement[ ] its final offer." May, supra note 10, at 807.
160 Similarly, Nebraska uses a time line structure to conduct negotiations for employ-
ees of the State of Nebraska. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 81-1369 to -1390 (1994). However, Ne-
braska's statutory system does not govern the labor relations process for municipal
employees, for the statute defines "employer" as the state and not "any political subdivision
thereof." I& § 81-1371(5).
161 See Com. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153d(b) (West 1996). The legislative body of the
school district may reject the settlement within thirty days of the filing of the contract. See
id. If that happens, the parties begin the arbitration process described infra text accompa-
nying notes 166-77. See id. § 10-153d(c).
162 See id. § 10-153f(b).
163 See i&




days to render a decision. 166 This decision is binding on the parties
unless two-thirds of the legislative body of the school district votes to
reject the decision. 167 In that case, the Commissioner selects a review
panel of three arbitrators who, within twenty days after selection, re-
view the decision on each rejected issue. 168 The arbitrators render a
final and binding decision within five days after completion of their
review.169 Upon filing by either party, the panel's decision is subject
to judicial review.170 Through this elaborate and mandatory proce-
dure, Connecticut seeks to avoid the difficulty of expiration without
having a subsequent agreement in place.
Avoiding strict time lines, Oklahoma has a unique statutory ap-
proach to bargaining and CBA expiration. Oklahoma grants teachers
the right to bargain, 171 and provides for minimum salaries that local
school boards may elect to increase.172 In addition, Oklahoma has
recently enacted a statute that prevents the post-expiration reduction
of wages within one year after a CBA expires. 173 The problem with
Oklahoma's rule, as applied to the post-expiration period, is its possi-
ble ambiguity in interpretation.
The statute's statement that employers may not reduce wages
seems to indicate that employers need not pay step increases after ex-
piration. 174 However, one can interpret the subsequent language that
the board may not reduce terms "agreed to in the expired collective
bargaining agreement"175 to mean that if the board had agreed to
automatic step increases during the life of the agreement, those in-
166 See i& § 10-153f(c) (3), (4).
167 See idU § 10-153f(c) (7).
168 See i&
169 See id.
170 See id& § 10-153f(c) (8).
171 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 509.2, 509.6 (West Supp. 1997).
172 Id. § 18-114.7 (limiting minimum salaries for the 1994-1995 school year).
'73 lI- § 18-114.8. The statute provides:
During the twelve-month period following the expiration of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, no district board of education may reduce the
wages, hours, fringe benefits or other terms and conditions of employment
for any category of employees that were agreed to in the expired collective
bargaining agreement, except pursuant to a subsequent collective bargain-
ing agreement or pursuant to implementation of the plan filed by the dis-
trict board of education . . . following exhaustion of the negotiations
impasse process ....
174 Id. Oklahoma case law strengthens this conclusion. In 1993, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma held unconstitutional an evergreen statute that applied to collective bargaining
for police and fire fighters. City of Del City v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 114,
869 P.2d 309, 318 (Ok. 1993). The statute could not require the payment of step increases
because it violated a provision of the Oklahoma Constitution preventing municipalities
from "'becom[ing indebted, in any manner.., to an amount exceeding, in any year the
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creases must continue after expiration. 7 6 Failure to do so would con-
stitute a reduction in the terms and conditions of employment in the
agreement.
C. Collective Bargaining Jurisdictions with No Statute or
Precedent on Point
In the District of Columbia, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota,
and Washington, no fixed rule governs the payment of salary step in-
creases after agreement expiration. 177 All of these states grant teach-
ers the right to bargain collectively,178 but vary in their treatment of
the expiration problem.
In some states, payment of steps often turns on the existence of
an "evergreen clause" in the collective bargaining agreement. This
clause extends the contract terms beyond the expiration of the agree-
ment in the event that the parties do not consummate a new agree-
ment before expiration. 179 Thus, because teachers received step
increases under the agreement, they continue to receive them once
the agreement expires.'8 0 Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, North Da-
kota, and South Dakota use this distinction, or an express contract
provision allowing payment of step increases, to award or withhold
step increases after expiration. 181
Without legal precedent on point, the other states vary in prac-
tice. In the District of Columbia, the governing body usually pays step
increases after expiration; 8 2 on the other hand, school boards in
Ohio generally do not.183 Finally, in Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, and
176 Given the Del City decision and the Oklahoma Constitution, this argument probably
cannot succeed. See supra note 174.
177 See May, supra note 10, at 786-90.
178 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-618.1 (1992); IDAHO CODE § 33-1271 (1995); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 72-5414 (1992); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 6-402 (1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.01
(West 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1369 to -1390 (1994); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 288.033,
288.150 (Michie 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-7D-5 (Michie 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-
38.1-01 (1993); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.03 (Anderson 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-
18-2 (Michie 1994); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 41.59.060(1) (West 1991).
179 An "evergreen contract" is "[a] contract which renews itself from year to year in
lieu of notice by one of the parties to the contrary." BLAcK's LAW DIaroNARY 555 (6th ed.
1990).
180 See In re Milton Sch. Dist., 625 A.2d 1056, 1059-60 (N.H. 1993) (explaining that an
enforceable automatic renewal or evergreen clause would be grounds to give step increases
to teachers) (quoting the Public Employment Labor Relations Board's order in the case).
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, however, held the clause unenforceable. Id at
1059.
181 See May, supra note 10, at 788-90.
182 See id. at 786-77.
183 See id. at 788.
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New Mexico, no general statewide practice exists.18 4 In Nebraska,
Ohio, and Washington, teachers often receive retroactive step in-
creases upon settlement of a new agreement.
185
D. Collective Bargaining Jurisdictions That Require Payment of
Step Increases
Of states that have decided the issue of post-expiration step in-
creases, the majority hold that school boards must pay step increases.
These states are: Alaska, 186 California,'8 7 Connecticut, 88 Delaware,'8 9
Florida,' 90 Indiana,' 92 Michigan, 92 Montana, 9 New Jersey, 94 New
184 See id. at 787-90. In New Mexico, the question has not arisen because the public
sector bargaining statute is only four years old. Id. at 789. In Kansas, the Kansas Supreme
Court expressly declined to decide the question of step increases after expiration. Na-
tional Educ. Ass'n-Wichita v. Board of Educ., 592 P.2d 80, 86 (Kan. 1979).
185 See May, supra note 10, at 788-90.
186 Alaska's Public Employment Relations Act, ALAsuA STAT. §§ 23.40.070 to .260
(Michie 1996), grants public employees the right to bargain collectively and governs the
bargaining relationship. In Mid-Kuskokwim Educ. Ass'n v. Kuspuk Sch. Dist., Nos. 93-149-ULP
& 93-162-ULP (Consolidated) (Alaska Labor Rel. Agency Feb. 22, 1993), the Labor Rela-
tions Agency interpreted ALAsKA STAT. § 23.40.110, which requires bargaining in good
faith, and held that parties must "maintain the status quo until they reach impasse." Mid-
Kuskokwim at 7. The employer in the case paid step increases before the Board issued its
decision, causing the Board to dismiss the Union's complaint as moot. See id at 8.
187 The California Educational Employment Relations Act, codified at CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 3540-3549.3 (West 1995), lays out the State's statutory procedures for collective
bargaining in public education. California's Public Employee Relations Board holds that
refusal to pay step increases after expiration constitutes a unilateral change in employment
conditions, which is also an unlawful refusal to negotiate under the California Educational
Employment Relations Act. Davis Unified Sch. Dist., [Transfer Binder 4] Cal. Pub. Em-
ployee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 11031, at 121, 124 (Cal. Pub. Employment Rel. Bd. Feb. 22,
1980).
188 Despite Connecticut's statutory scheme, discussed supra Part II.B, the issue of step
increases under expired agreements can arise. In fact, Connecticut was the first state to
confront this particular issue. See May, supra note 10, at 790. In Ledyard Bd. of Educ. (Conn.
St. Bd. of Labor Rel. Aug. 15, 1977), the Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations,
relying on CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e(b)(4) (West 1996) and NLRB precedent, estab-
lished the rule that "[riegular annual salary increments payable under existing policies or
practice constitute an existing condition of employment whether or not the increment was
mandated by contract, and a discontinuance of such a policy or practice constitutes a
change in existing wages and conditions of employment." Ledyard at 2. The Connecticut
State Board of Labor Relations holds that school boards must pay step increases even after
the parties reach arbitration in the impasse procedures described above Part II.B. Bran-
ford Bd. of Educ., No. 2274, at 1, 3 (Conn. St. Bd. of Labor Rel. Feb. 17, 1984).
189 See May, supra note 10, at 797-98 (discussing Delaware's rule to pay step increases
after expiration, which originated in Appoquinimink Educ. Ass'n, No. 1-2-84A (Del. Pub. Em-
ployment Rel. Bd. July 28, 1984)). In rendering its decision, the Delaware Public Employ-
ment Relations Board relied on the federal private sector Katz doctrine, discussed supra at
Part I.C. Id
190 Florida's rule supporting payment of steps is somewhat uncertain. The Florida
Public Employment Relations Commission ruled in 1982 that employers must pay step
increases after expiration because employees expect the terms of employment to continue.
Nassau County Sch. Bd., [Transfer Binder 8] Fla. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press)
13206, at 390, 395 (Fla. Pub. Employment Rel. Comm'n Apr. 30, 1982). However, while
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York, 9 5 Oregon;19 6 Rhode Island, 97 Tennessee, 9 8 Vermont,19 9 and
the Commission continues to rule that districts must pay steps after expiration, Florida
courts have disagreed. Those courts have relied on FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.309(2) (West
1981), which stated that failure of a legislative body to appropriate sufficient funds for a
collective bargaining agreement does not constitute an unfair labor practice. Using this
language, the court in Sarasota County Sch. Dist. v. Sarasota Classifled/Teachers Ass'n, 614
So.2d 1143 (1993), reversed the Florida Public Employment Relations Commission, and
held that the school board did not commit an unfair labor practice by unilaterally discon-
tinuing payment of steps during negotiations. Id. at 1149. That decision may be untenable
after the latest revision to the statute. The new version of the statute adds "if the state is a
party to a collective bargaining agreement" and changes the words "legislative body" to
"Legislature." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.309 (2) (b) (West Supp. 1996). After these changes,
the rule against increases seemingly does not apply to local school boards. Therefore,
Florida's rule on this subject is currently in doubt. See May, supra note 10, at 804-05 (dis-
cussing the Commission's and the courts' different approaches to this problem in Florida).
191 Indiana's authority for payment of step increases after expiration is Indiana Educ.
Employment ReL Bd. v. Mill Creek Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 456 N.E.2d 709 (Ind. 1983). In
that case, the Supreme Court of Indiana held that school boards must pay step increases
after expiration. Id. at 712-13. The court relied on IND. CODE ANN. § 20-7.5-1-12(e)
(Michie 1992), which states in part that "[dlluring this status quo period in order to permit
the successful resolution of the dispute, the employer may not unilaterally change the
terms or conditions of employment that are issues in dispute."
192 Jackson Community College Classfied & Technical Ass'n v. Jackson Community College;
468 N.W.2d 61, 63 (Mich. App. 1991) held that a post-expiration salary freeze before im-
passe is unlawful because it violates a state statute forbidding unilateral changes.
193 See May, supra note 10, at 796-97 (explaining that the Montana Board of Personnel
Appeals, relying on the similarity between its own public sector bargaining laws, MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-31-101 to -409 (1995), and federal labor statutes, used NLRB precedent
to require the payment of salary step increases after expiration in Forsyth Educ. Ass'n, No.
37-81 (Mont. Bd. of Personnel App. May 17, 1982)).
194 NewJersey's rule originated in Galloway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Galloway Township
Educ. Ass'n, 393 A.2d 218 (N.J. 1978), which interpreted NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (West
1988) to hold that parties must negotiate modifications of existing rules. After a revision
to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A.29-4.1 (West 1989), which no longer required the payment of
increments, the Public Employment Relations Commission found that the revised section
did not "prohibit the creation of a contractual obligation to pay automatic increments."
Evesham Township Bd. of Educ., [Transfer Binder 21] N.J. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel.
Press) 1 26001, at 3, 4 (N.J. Pub. Employment Rel. Comm'n Oct. 28, 1994). Thus, despite
the change, the Commission affirmed the past rule, finding that unilaterally changing a
contract term prior to impasse constitutes a per se refusal to negotiate in good faith if the
parties have committed themselves to it. Id.
195 N.Y. Cir. SERV. LAW §209 (McKinney 1983) contains provisions for dispute resolu-
tions in New York's public sector. For a discussion of the evolution of New York's rule on
the issue of post-expiration step increases, see infra text accompanying notes 202-22.
196 Oregon's support for payment of step increases relies largely on NewJersey prece-
dent and its treatment of Katz, discussed supra at note 194 and infra at text accompanying
notes 300-04, 401-04. In Portland Community College, 9 Pub. Employer Collective Bargaining
Rep. (Lab. Law Pub.) 9018, 9029 (Or. Employment Rel. Bd. Sept. 1986) the court held that
a freeze of step increases violates the requirement for the employer to bargain in good
faith, Op. REV. STAT. § 243.672(1) (e) (1991), because unilateral action without prior dis-
cussion is a refusal to bargain about a mandatory subject.
197 See May, supra note 10, at 800-01 (discussing Warwick Sch. Comm., No. ULP-4647,
at 1, 2-3 (R.I. Labor Rel. Bd. Nov. 10, 1992), where the Board found an unfair labor prac-
tice when the school committee made unilateral changes (other than freezing step in-
creases) during negotiation for a new agreement).
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Wisconsin. 200 New York serves as the most interesting example be-
cause the state reversed its rule several years ago.2 0 1 The New York
Court of Appeals announced the state's original rule in 1977 in Board
of Cooperative Educational Services v. New York State Public Employment Re-
lations Board.20 2 The Board of Cooperative Educational Services
("BOCES") and the BOCES Staff Council had entered into four col-
lective agreements in their bargaining history.2 0 3 The agreements
provided for payment of automatic step increases each year.204 When
previous agreements expired before the completion of a successor
agreement, BOCES continued to pay step increases to employees.
2 0 5
In the negotiation for the fifth agreement, however, BOCES passed a
resolution that, in effect, froze salaries and avoided paying step in-
creases to returning employees.
20 6
The hearing officer found a violation in BOCES's refusal to pay
step increases.20 7 The PERB agreed and ordered BOCES to "cease
and desist" from refusing to pay step increases.208 The PERB noted
198 The Supreme Court of Tennessee has followed federal labor law precedent in de-
ciding that unilateral changes during negotiation are a refusal to bargain in good faith.
Smith County Educ. Ass'n v. Anderson, 676 S.W.2d 328, 338 (Tenn. 1984) (concerning
unilateral refusals to pay insurance premiums and deduct union dues from salaries). How-
ever, Tennessee districts have a defense to payment in a failure to request funds for salary
increases; in addition, agreements to pay increases are subject to approval by the local
legislative body. See Carter County Bd. of Educ. Comm'rs v. American Fed'n of Teachers
609 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).
199 The Vermont Labor Relations Board relied on Katz and Vermont statutes in an-
nouncing Vermont's decision to mandate step increases after expiration. Chester Educ.
Ass'n v. Chester-Andover Sch. Bd. of Dirs., 1 Vt. Lab. Rel. Bd. 426, 433-44 (1978). In 1992,
the Board affirmed its rule in Vermont-NEA/NEA-Readsboro Chapter v. Readsboro Bd. of Sch.
Dirs., 15 Vt. Lab. Rel. Bd. 268 (1992). See generally May, supra note 10, at 757-68 (explaining
Vermont precedent pertaining to the post-expiration step increase issue). For an extensive
discussion of, reaction to, and conclusions about the rule in Vermont, see id at 768-75,
810-14.
200 See May, supra note 10, at 798-99 (discussing Wisconsin's adoption of its rule in
Hartmann, No. 28629 MP-1251 (Wis. Employment Rel. Comm'n Mar. 22, 1985), where the
Commission decided that an employer must continue to grant changes in compensation
after expiration when the expired agreement, by its terms or history, provides for changes
based upon level of experience or education). In formulating its rule, the Commission
relied on federal precedent and decisions from other states. Id. at 799.
201 See infra text accompanying notes 214-22.
202 363 N.E.2d 1174 (N.Y. 1977).




207 See id. at 1175-76. In the hearing, the officer relied on a past PERB decision hold-
ing that it is a violation of the employer's duty to bargain in good faith to unilaterally alter
a long-standing and continued practice of annual step increments, even though the agree-
ment containing the increments had expired. See id. at 1176.
208 Id. at 1176. The Appellate Division later modified PERB's order, finding it did not
have the authority to order BOCES to cease and desist from refusing to pay; rather, PERB
had the power to remedy the situation only by ordering BOCES to negotiate in good faith.
Id.
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that "it makes no difference... whether or not the practice of paying
increments was ever embodied in an agreement."20 9 Ultimately, the
New York Court of Appeals held that "after the expiration of an em-
ployment agreement, it is not a violation of [the] duty to negotiate in
good faith to discontinue during the negotiations for a new agree-
ment [on] the payment of automatic annual salary increments, how-
ever . . .long standing the practice of paying such increments may
have been. '210 Finding that the payment of step increases after expi-
ration changes the nature of the relationship between the parties dur-
ing negotiation, the court felt that payment gave the employees an
"edge" in negotiation rather than maintaining the existing relation-
ship.21' Furthermore, the court reasoned that no statutory authority
existed for such a requirement,2 1 2 and that having such a requirement
could place an impermissible burden on employers because it ignores
factors such as "comparative compensation, the condition of the pub-
lic fisc and a myriad of localized strengths and difficulties. 21 3
Five years later, the New York legislature amended its statute,
2 14
reversing the ruling. The new version of the statute made it an im-
proper practice for a public employer "to refuse to continue all the
terms of an expired agreement until a new agreement is negoti-
ated."215 Cobleskill Central SchoolDistrict v. Newman216 reflects this statu-
tory amendment. After the school district froze salaries upon
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the teachers' asso-
ciation filed an improper practice charge with the PERB.217 The
Board found for the teachers and the school district appealed.218 On
appeal, the court found that the New York legislature, via its statutory
amendment,21 9 acted purposely to change the outcome of the BOCES
case. 220 Consequently, the court agreed with the teachers that the dis-
trict should have paid them "in accordance with [the] teacher's lon-
gevity and educational qualification status as it existed at the
beginning of the new pay period."221 Since that decision, PERB has
sustained an exception to the rule requiring payment-if the contract
209 Id.
210 Id at 1175.
211 Id. at 1177.
212 Id at 1178.
213 Id. at 1177.
214 N.Y. Cv. SERV. LAw § 209-a.1 (e) (McKinney 1983).
215 Id.
216 481 N.Y.S.2d 795 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
217 See id at 796.
218 See id.
219 N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAW § 209-a.1(e).
220 CobleskiU, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
221 Id. at 797.
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terms limit the salary grid to the specific dates of the agreement, then
withholding step increases is lawful.
222
Like New York, several of the states that require districts to pay
step increases base their decision on an interpretation of their own
statutory scheme.223 These states typically find that a unilateral
change during negotiations constitutes an unfair labor practice be-
cause such a change is tantamount to a refusal to bargain, or bargain-
ing in bad faith.224 Other states rely on federal labor law precedent to
rule that teachers must receive step increases. 225 Even though federal
labor law does not technically apply to public employees, 226 these
states find that no reason exists to differentiate between the private
and public sectors on the question of unilateral post-expiration
changes. This determination is due to the similarity of their labor laws
and federal law.227 Still other states rely on a combination of both
their own statutory schemes and federal private sector labor law.
228
E. Jurisdictions in Which Payment of Step Increases Depends
upon Local Past Practice
Similar to the exception to New York's rule requiring payment,
the question of step increase payment after contract expiration in Illi-
nois229 and Massachusetts230 turns on the practice and contract of the
local school district. The Massachusetts rule is the more recent, aris-
ing from a 1995 Labor Relations Commission decision, Town of Chat-
222 See Waterford Teachers Ass'n, 27 Pub. Employment Rel. Bd. (Lab. Rel. Press)
4540 (N.Y. Pub. Employment Rel. Bd. Apr. 11, 1994); Suffolk County, 18 Pub. Employment
Rel. Bd. (Lab. Rel. Press) 3030 (N.Y. Pub. Employment Rel. Bd. Apr. 30, 1985).
223 In addition to New York, these states include Alaska, Florida, Indiana, Michigan,
and NewJersey. See supra notes 186, 190-92, 194.
224 See, e.g., Eveshan Township Bd. of Educ., [Transfer Binder 21] NJ. Pub. Employee
Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 26001, at 3, 4 (N.J. Pub. Employment Rel. Comm'n Oct. 28, 1994)
(stating that a unilateral change in status quo is a per se illegal refusal to negotiate in good
faith).
225 Delaware, Oregon, Tennessee, and Wisconsin have used this analysis tojustify their
rule. See supra notes 189, 196, 198, 200.
226 See supra Part I.C.2.a.
227 See, e.g., May, supra note 10, at 796-97 (discussing Forsyth Educ. Ass'n, No. 37-81, at
3 (Mont. Bd. of Personnel App. May 17, 1982)).
228 These states include Connecticut and Vermont. See supra notes 188, 199; May,
supra note 10, at 760-61.
229 In Vienna Sch. Dist. No. 55 v. Illinois Educ. Labor Rel. Bd., 515 N.E.2d 476 (ill. App.
Ct. 1987), the court established Illinois's rule that school districts must pay step increases
only if the practice is an established one. Id. at 479-80. The court found the district's
refusal to pay step increases after expiration to be a violation. Id. at 480. However, Illinois
courts decide the issue case by case. See id. In WilmetteEduc. Ass'n [Transfer Binder 1] Pub.
Employee Rep. for Ill. (Lab. Rel. Press) 1077, at 327 (Ill. Educ. Lab. Rel. Bd. May 17,
1988), the board found no violation because the district had always withheld step increases
after expiration of the agreement; therefore, the teachers had no reasonable expectation
of receiving them. Id. at 329.
230 See infra text accompanying notes 231-36.
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ham.231 In Town of Chatham, the agreement provided that the contract
ran only to a certain date, and not thereafter.2 32 Under the life of the
agreement, employees received step increases each year.233 The Com-
mission held that the employer must pay step increases only if pay-
ment had "become a part of the established practice between the
parties," 23 4 and therefore, part of the status quo.23 5 Because the par-
ties failed to show the history of the bargaining relationship on this
issue, the Commission ruled that the step increases did not constitute
part of the status quo, and therefore, the employer did not have to pay
them.2 36 In essence, the Commission held that employers must pay
post-expiration step increases when the parties have included or in-
tended these increases in their agreements, or when the established
and proven practice of the parties is the payment of post-expiration
increases.
F. Collective Bargaining Jurisdictions That Refuse to Pay Step
Increases
Only Hawaii,23 7 Maine, 238 New Hampshire, 23 9 and Penn-
sylvania 240 prohibit the payment of step increases after contract expi-
ration. Maine ruled in favor of this approach in 1995.241 Although the
Maine decision dealt with college and university employees, no reason
exists to believe that the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine would rule
differently if faced with the same situation involving other public edu-
cation employees. 242 In Board of Trustees v. Associated COLT Staff,243
231 21 Mass. Lab. Rel. Rep. (New England Legal Pub.) 1526 (Mass. Lab. Rel. Comm'n
Jan. 5, 1995).
232 Id. at 1527.
233 See id.
234 Id. at 1531.
235 Id. at 1530-31.
236 Id. at 1531-32.
237 In Hawaii, movement between steps on the salary schedule is a subject of good faith
negotiation. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-9(a) (Michie 1996). Because step increases are
an express subject of negotiation, no step increases are paid until after the conclusion of
negotiations.
238 See infra text accompanying notes 241-65.
239 See infra text accompanying notes 267-91.
240 Failure to pay step increases in Pennsylvania does not violate the requirement to
maintain the status quo in negotiations. See Fairview Sch. Dist v. Commonwealth, Unem-
ployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 454 A.2d 517, 521 (Pa. 1982) (unemployment
compensation claims setting).
241 See Board of Trustees v. Associated COLT Staff, 659 A.2d 842 (Me. 1995).
242 Although Maine has separate bargaining laws for employees of the University of
Maine system and municipal public employees (which includes public school teachers),
the University of Maine System Labor Relations Act, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1021-
1035 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996), and the Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations
Law, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 961-974 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996), are "similar in all
material respects." Board of Trustees, 659 A.2d at 844 n.3.
243 659 A.2d 842 (Me. 1995).
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Maine's highest court ruled that the language of Maine's public em-
ployer labor statute required adoption of a wage freeze after expira-
tion.244 The parties involved 245 had a collective bargaining agreement
with a duration of three years.2 46 In the agreement, "employees would
advance from one . . .step to the next and receive the specified in-
crease in wages. When the agreement expired, the University ad-
hered to the last wage schedule, and discontinued the . . . step
increases .... "247
The union complained that the University's action constituted a
prohibited practice. The Maine Labor Relations Board agreed, find-
ing a violation in the discontinuance of payments. 248 According to
the Board, discontinuing the step increases constituted a unilateral
change in conditions of employment, which violated the University's
duty to bargain.24 9 On appeal, the Superior Court vacated the
Board's decision, finding that the Board's decision was an invasion
into the substantive aspects of the agreement.
250
In analyzing the case on review, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine first noted that until 1991, the Board had followed the static
status quo rule, "constru[ing] status quo to mean ... wages existent at
the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. '25 1 In a 1981 af-
firmance of that interpretation,252 the court relied explicitly on New
York's rule from Board of Cooperative Educational Services v. New York
State Public Employment Relations Board.253 In 1991, however, the Board
reversed itself, adopting the dynamic status quo position and setting
the stage for the Board of Trustees litigation.
254
In the instant case, the court found that the dynamic status quo
rule subverted the language and intent of the University of Maine Sys-
tem Labor Relations Act.255 First, like federal private sector labor
244 Id. at 846.
245 The union represented a unit of clerical, office, laboratory, and technical employ-
ees of the University of Maine system. See id at 843 n.1.




250 Id. In labor law, the arbiter of a labor dispute either interprets and enforces an
existing agreement or rules on only the procedural aspects of bargaining; the tribunal may
not dictate substantive aspects of a collective agreement. See NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C.
§158(d) (1994) (providing that the NLRB may not require parties to compromise a firmly
held position and accept any substantive term of the agreement).
251 Board of Trustees, 659 A.2d at 844.
252 Id. at 844-45 (citing M.SA.D. No. 43 Teachers' Ass'n v. M.S.A.D. No. 43 Bd. of Dirs.,
432 A.2d 395, 397-98 (Me. 1981)).
253 363 N.E.2d 1174 (N.Y. 1977) (discussed supra Part II.D).
254 See Board of Trustees, 659 A.2d at 845.
255 Id. at 845-46.
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law,256 the Act specifies that the Board cannot force either party to
agree to a proposal or make a concession.257 According to the court,
requiring the University to pay step increases constituted a substantial
concession, especially given the impact of wages on a public em-
ployer's budget.258 Second, the court found adoption of the static sta-
tus quo rule "consistent with the Legislature's clearly expressed intent
to protect municipal . .. budgets from increases in wages imposed
without agreement by the governing body."259 The court reasoned
that the dynamic status quo rule forced the University trustees to pay
wages they never agreed to pay, and therefore changed the status quo
during negotiation, "dramatically alter[ing] the status and bargaining
positions of the parties. 26 °
Indicating the closeness of this issue, three justices of the seven
member court dissented, rejecting the majority's interpretation of
Maine's public sector labor law, as well as its history and intent.2
61
Disputing the majority's characterization of the dynamic status quo
rule as imposing a concession on a party to the agreement, ChiefJus-
tice Wathen, writing for the dissent, stated that "the Board has no au-
thority to determine what the parties should be bargaining toward
(the final terms of an agreement), but it is empowered to determine
what the parties should be bargaining from (the existing terms and
conditions of employment).,"262 The dissent then noted that the dy-
namic status quo rule is consistent with both private sector labor law
and court and agency decisions in other states. 263 Addressing the
"[fliscal [c]oncerns [u]nderlying the [c]ourt's opinion,"264 the dis-
sent stressed the importance of the duty to bargain and argued that
fiscal policy concerns "are properly matters for legislative considera-
tion rather than a judicially-crafted hardship exception to the duty to
bargain."26
5
The Maine court's decision in Board of Trustees relied in part on
New Hampshire's recently adopted static status quo rule.266 Because
it is the most recent case to decide this issue directly for public school
teachers, the New Hampshire case 267 is worthy of analysis. Most of the
facts of the case are by now predictable. The parties entered a collec-
256 See supra note 250.
257 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1026(1) (C) (West 1988).
258 Board of Trustees, 659 A.2d at 845.
259 Id. at 845-46.
260 Id. at 846.
261 Id. at 848-49 (Wathen, C.J. dissenting).
262 Id. at 848 (Wathen, G.J., dissenting).
263 I& (Wathen, C.J., dissenting).
264 Id. at 849 (Wathen, C.J., dissenting) (italics omitted).
265 Id. (Wathen, C.J., dissenting).
266 Id. at 845.
267 In re Milton Sch. Dist., 625 A.2d 1056 (N.H. 1993).
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tive bargaining agreement spanning two years.268 In each of the years,
teachers received a salary step increase.269 In addition, the parties ad-
ded an amendment to the agreement during the life of the agree-
ment, stating that "' [t]his agreement shall automatically renew itself
for successive terms of one year or until a successor agreement has
been ratified."' 270 This clause would seem to secure payment of step
increases for teachers, and the New Hampshire Public Employment
Labor Relations Board held that it did.27 1 In its decision, the Board
relied explicitly on the presence of this evergreen clause to require
payment of step increases.2 72
However, the Board overlooked a New Hampshire law273 requir-
ing submission of cost items to the town for approval. This was a fatal
error in the view of the majority of the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire. First, the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations
Act 274 defines "[c] ost item" as "any benefit acquired through collec-
tive bargaining whose implementation requires an appropriation by
the legislative body of the public employer with which negotiations
are being conducted."275 Because the renewal clause rendered the
contract a "multi-year contract with no termination date," the clause
was a cost item. 276 Second, the parties must submit cost items to the
"legislative body of the public employer for approval."2 77 Having pre-
viously interpreted the statute to "'divest[ ] the school [district] of its
authority to bind the town to future appropriations without action by
the school district voters,"' 278 the district could not bind the town in
Milton because the parties had failed to obtain voter approval of the
renewal clause. 279 Approving Board precedent, the court then ruled
that in the absence of an approved evergreen clause, the district was
not required to pay step increases after expiration of the CBA.
280





273 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:3, 11(b) (1987).
274 §§ 273-A-1 to -A:17.
275 § 273-A.1, V.
276 Milton, 625 A.2d at 1059.
277 § 273-A.3, II(b).
278 Milton, 625 A.2d at 1059 (quoting In re Sanborn Regional Sch. Bd., 579 A-2d 282,
285 (N.H. 1990) (alteration in original)).
279 Id. The court also noted that the parties themselves were not bound to the agree-
ment because "neither party may enforce a CBA if the legislative body rejects the cost items
in it." Id- (citing In re Franklin Educ. Ass'n, 616 A.2d 919, 920-21 (N.H. 1992)). Although
the town in Milton never rejected the renewal clause, the court asserted: "It would elevate
form over substance to make a distinction... between the town specifically rejecting a cost
item and the town simply never approving the item." Id.
280 Id.
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Interestingly, the union argued that because the majority of other
states had adopted the dynamic status quo rule, New Hampshire
should as well.28' In one paragraph, the court dismissed that argu-
ment, noting, first that "most of these decisions were... mandated by
statute,"28 2 and, second, that many of the decisions relied "in part
upon a definition of 'status quo' quite different from the one adopted
by the [Board] ."283
Two dissenting judges noted the proper standard of review of
Board findings and felt that the Board had not acted unjustly or un-
reasonably or clearly abused its discretion; therefore, the dissenters
would have upheld the Board's decision granting step increases. 28 4
Citing an inconsistency in the Board's reasoning, the dissent ex-
plained that the court, after calling the evergreen clause a cost item,
simultaneously held that the Board "erroneously granted step in-
creases during the time in question," but permissibly allowed auto-
matic renewal protections for other provisions of the agreement,
including base salaries, health benefits, and pay for lunch duty.2 8 5 In
other words, if the evergreen clause really was a cost item, then all
provisions extended by it needed town voter approval. By the court's
reasoning, because the clause received no such approval, the district
could not pay teachers for anything after the agreement expired.
To the dissent, the evergreen clause was "surplusage, 286 as it
"merely highlight[ed] the well-settled principle that the status quo
must be maintained while contract negotiations for public employees
... are underway.128 7 In defining the status quo, the dissent con-
tended that "in order to maintain the status quo, all terms and condi-
tions of employment set forth in the previous agreement must be
maintained."288 Because annual step increases were included in the
agreement, they constituted a term or condition of employment, and
281 See id. at 1060.
282 Id. The court cited only the decisions of New Jersey and New York, discussed supra
at text accompanying notes 118-16, 202-22 and at note 194; in addition, the court failed to
note that many states deciding to adopt the dynamic status quo rule relied in part on
federal private sector precedent as well.
283 Id. This circular argument merely notes the difference between the two rules (dy-
namic versus static) and fails to explain why the static rule is the better of the two. In
avoiding the difficult question, the court accepted the Board's definition of status quo as if
required to do so; nevertheless, the court did not hesitate to overturn the Board's ruling in
this case.
284 Id. at 1065 (Brock, CJ., dissenting).
285 Id- at 1062 (Brock, GJ., dissenting).
286 Id. at 1063 (Brock, CJ., dissenting).
287 Id. (Brock, C.J., dissenting).
288 ML (Brock, C.J., dissenting).
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the district had to continue to pay them. 289 To support its view, the
dissent noted that the court's decision ignored Katz and many states'
reliance on Katz in developing public sector labor jurisprudence.
290
In addition, the dissent argued that the step increases were a term or
condition of employment based upon the teachers' reasonable expec-
tations from the agreement, bargaining history, and past practice.
291
The New Hampshire and Maine decisions illustrate the continu-
ing conflict and difficulty states experience in applying the status quo
doctrine, which evolved from the Supreme Court's 1962 Katz decision.
Decisional law and statutes of other states serve as evidence of the
possible approaches in crafting a solution to the post-expiration scena-
rio. The next Part analyzes the various approaches and advocates
adoption of the dynamic status quo rule, with some exceptions.
III
Tim BEST SOLUTION: COMPLIANCE WITH LABOR POLICY AND
LAw AND PRESERVATION OF LOCAL CONTROL
As Part II demonstrates, courts have exhibited considerable disa-
greement when applying Katz to the public sector. Given that two of
the most recent decisions adopted the minority "static status quo" po-
sition,292 the issue remains unsettled. In addition, at least one state's
dynamic status quo rule is of questionable efficacy. 293 These develop-
ments are troubling because the legal. and policy foundations on
which both the static status quo rule and adoptions of it rest are dubi-
ous at best. In addition, proposed solutions to the problem that de-
pend on strict time restraints for bargaining are objectionable because
they wrest control of local matters, especially important fiscal control,
from local hands. In contrast, the dynamic status quo rule makes
legal and practical sense and courts should adopt it because of its
compatibility with the language of Katz. However, to avoid the same
weakness as the strict time line solution, courts should allow the par-
ties in certain circumstances to escape application of the dynamic sta-
tus quo, thereby preserving local control over district financial
matters.
289 See id at 1065 (arguing that the case is not about evergreen clauses or step in-
creases, but about the survivability of terms and conditions of employment which the dis-
trict must maintain during negotiations) (Brock, GJ., dissenting).
290 Id. at 1063 (Brock, CJ., dissenting).
291 Id. at 1064 (Brock, CJ., dissenting).
292 See supra Part II.F (discussing the recent Maine and New Hampshire Supreme
Court decisions).
293 For a discussion of Florida's rule, see supra note 190.
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A. The Weakness of the Static Status Quo Rule and the Latest
Adoptions of It
All applications of the status quo doctrine derive from the lan-
guage in Katz that "an employer's unilateral change in conditions of
employment under negotiation is ... a violation of § 8(a) (5) [of the
NLRA], for it is a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which frus-
trates the objectives of § 8(a) (5) much as does a flat refusal. '294 The
static status quo rule interprets "conditions of employment" with re-
spect to wages to mean that "wages existent at the expiration of a col-
lective bargaining agreement [are] frozen."295  The reasoning
supporting this conclusion seems simple and logical: "[t] o say that the
status quo must be maintained during negotiations is one thing; to say
that the status quo includes a change and means automatic increases
in salary is another."296 In other words, maintaining the status quo
means maintaining the exact amount of salary, not changing it.
This interpretation of Katz is fundamentally flawed. In requiring
the maintenance of conditions of employment, Katz compels the con-
tinued existence of the wage provision, not the actual amount of the
wage.297 Therefore, if the expired agreement contains a salary sched-
ule with automatic step raises, the schedule and those step raises, as
terms of the expired agreement, survive expiration along with the
agreement's other terms. Suppose that under a three year agreement,
teacher Xearns $20,000 in year one, $21,000 in year two, and $22,250
in year three. If the agreement expires after year three, the terms of
the expired agreement do not provide that teacher X would earn
$22,250 each year, and should therefore earn the same amount after
expiration. The agreement instead provides that teachers earn the
appropriate salary based upon the number of years of service.298 In
year four, given the additional year of service, teacher Xmust earn the
amount that the salary schedule provides for year four, an amount
greater than $22,250. The salary schedule, and whatever terms govern
its operation, are the status quo. They constitute the conditions that
existed prior to expiration, and thus, the terms to which the school
board obligated itself until the settlement of a successor agreement.
294 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962); see also supra Part I.C.3 (explaining the
development of the status quo doctrine).
295 Board of Trustees v. Associated COLT Staff, 659 A.2d 842, 844 (Me. 1995).
296 Board of Coop. Educ. Servs. v. New York State Pub. Employment Rel. Bd., 363
N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (N.Y. 1977), quoted in Board of Trustees, 659 A.2d at 844 (emphasis
omitted).
297 See Board of Trustees, 659 A.2d at 847 (quoting the Maine Labor Relations Board's
ruling in this case).




A hypothetical situation demonstrates both the necessary survival
of the salary schedule and step increases and the way that the static
status quo actually fails to maintain the status quo. The theoretical
possibility exists that a union and a school board might never reach a
successor agreement. If this occurred, the agreement, as the status
quo, would continue to govern the parties' relationship indefinitely.
Under the terms of the agreement, the teachers would continue to
move up the salary schedule in subsequent years. New teachers would
begin at the appropriate level and move up with the passage of time.
All teachers would maintain and execute, as part of the status quo, the
same duties and obligations as the agreement required. Such action,
in accordance with the terms of their agreement, is the status quo of
their relationship. Though the agreement literally expires, it stays in
effect until the parties reach a new agreement.
In contrast, a system that operates in conformity with the static
status quo clearly alters the agreement, thereby failing to maintain the
status quo. The teachers would, for example, continue to perform
lunch duty and attend faculty meetings as the terms of the expired,
but operative, agreement provided. However, their salaries would re-
main forever unchanged. This system effectively pretends that the
agreement's salary schedule does not exist and replaces it with wage
provisions that read, for eternity, "Mr. Alberts earns $22,500; Ms. Teb-
betts earns $25,000; Mr. Fogarty earns $32,000," and so forth. This
quite literally changes the terms of the agreement, altering the status
quo in contravention of the duty to maintain existing conditions of
employment. The parties' agreement contains a salary schedule,
properly maintained by the dynamic status quo. The static status quo,
in contrast, removes that schedule and replaces it with a series of indi-
vidual salary agreements that does not accurately reflect the relation-
ship between the parties.
Thus, this scenario illustrates the irony that the static status quo
rule, whose name "static" seems to connote constancy, actually
changes the status quo, in flat circumvention of the status quo re-
quirement. It is the dynamic status quo rule, whose name seems to
suggest a change, that actually preserves the status quo, for it main-
tains the terms that govern the employment relationship as of
expiration.
One argument offered in support of the static status quo rule,
despite its legal and logical shortcomings, is that allowing step in-
creases after expiration unfairly tips the balance in bargaining posi-
tion too heavily toward teachers.29 9 Following this argument, one
299 See, e.g., Portland Community College, 9 Pub. Employer Collective Bargaining Rep.
(Lab. Law Pub.) 9018, 9031 (Or. Employment Rel. Bd. Sept. 1986) (Ellis, Chairman, dis-
senting) (arguing that "implementing salary step increases of an expired contract does not
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state, Oregon, once adopted a "relative balance of bargaining power"
exception to its dynamic status quo rule.300 This exception allowed
the employer to make a unilateral change if it would "maintain [ ] the
relative balance of bargaining power between the parties."301 Eight
years after adopting the exception, however, Oregon flatly, and prop-
erly, rejected it.302 In its repudiation of the exception, the Oregon
Employment Relations Board properly recognized that such an excep-
tion misconceives the purpose of the status quo doctrine.303 The
Board reasoned:
The status quo doctrine is not grounded on a policy decision that
[the] Board must try to preserve the relative balance of bargaining
power-although we believe application of the doctrine generally
does help preserve that balance. Rather, the status quo doctrine is
based on the statutory mandate that an employer must bargain in
good faith over changes in working conditions and the concomitant
requirement of [the state's public employee bargaining statute and
the NLRA] that such bargaining must be completed before-not
after-a change is made.304
The same reasoning overcomes the argument that the dynamic status
quo rule changes the balance of bargaining power. The purpose of
the status quo doctrine is to require bargaining in good faith to im-
passe, not to maintain an equality of bargaining power.3 05 Unilateral
changes subvert good faith bargaining.30 6 The withholding of step in-
creases, even to maintain the relative balance of bargaining power,
constitutes a unilateral change in a condition of employment to which
the parties agreed, and therefore violates the duty to bargain in good
faith.3 0 7 Even if the purpose of the status quo doctrine was to main-
tain relative bargaining power, it is the dynamic status quo that does
so. The parties agreed to pay and receive a salary according to a
schedule, and not individually bargained amounts. The requirement
to pay in accordance with that schedule maintains the same relation-
ship between the parties while negotiations occur, and actually pre-
tend to encourage bargaining or provide a parity of bargaining power, instead it tips the
bargaining table in a way which obstructs and hinders negotiations").
300 MEt at 9023.
301 Id.
302 See id at 9024 (holding "that there should be no 'relative balance of power' excep-
tion to the status quo doctrine").
303 1&
304 Id.
305 See Board of Trustees v. Associated COLT Staff, 659 A.2d 842, 849 (Me. 1995)
(Wathen, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the legislature "imposed the duty to bargain, and it
is that duty that the Board has interpreted to require the preservation. of existing practices
until impasse").
306 See supra Part I.C.1.
307 See supra text accompanying note 65.
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serves the relative bargaining power by keeping the same agreement
in place until the parties complete a new one.
An additional argument offered in support of the static status quo
rule is that parties can and should negotiate the survival of step in-
creases.8 0 8 If a school board later agrees to pay step increases under
the terms of a new agreement, the board can pay any missed step in-
creases retroactively. 0 9 This position therefore requires that the par-
ties "bargain in good faith over all terms and conditions of
employment. This includes the possible carry-over of such terms and
conditions to cover them during a hiatus after a prior contract expires
and while [the parties] are negotiating a new contract."310
Such an approach misses the point. The parties ought to be free
to negotiate nonpayment of step increases until the signing of a new
agreement if they so desire. 31' The focus of the status quo rule is the
duty to bargain in good faith.3A2 Parties who have bargained in good
faith for a different provision have already fulfilled the purpose of the
rule. However, to argue that teachers can receive step increases retro-
actively is an unsatisfactory solution, if the agreement contains provi-
sions for step increases. The principal concern of the status quo
doctrine is not that teachers get the money, but rather that parties
continue to follow the terms of the agreement that constitute the con-
ditions of employment, thereby fulfilling their obligation to negotiate
in good faith. 313
In addition, requiring parties to bargain over the extension of
terms does not follow fundamental principles of labor law. The
NLRA, on which most states base their bargaining laws, 314 requires
bargaining only for "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment."115 The salary schedule itself is clearly a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining, for it determines wages.3 16  However, the
survivability of the schedule after expiration is not a mandatory sub-
ject, but a permissive one. In Litton Financial Printing Division v.
NURB,317 the Supreme Court recognized the operation of the Katz
308 See Portland Community College, 9 Pub. Employer Collective Bargaining Rep. at
9030 (Ellis, Chairman, dissenting).
309 See Board of Coop. Educ. Servs. v. New York State Pub. Employment Rel. Bd., 363
N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (N.Y. 1977).
310 Portland Community College, 9 Pub. Employer Collective Bargaining Rep. at 9030
(Ellis, Chairman, dissenting).
311 See infra Part III.F.
312 See supra Part I.C.1 and supra text accompanying note 305.
313 See supra text accompanying note 65.
314 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
315 NLRA, § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
316 See infra Part III.C.
317 501 U.S. 190 (1991).
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rule in the post-expiration setting.318 A belief that setting post-expira-
tion terms was a mandatory subject of negotiation for the initial terms
of the agreement would preclude the Court from making its approv-
ing statement in Litton. If the Court required parties to negotiate
which terms survived the agreement's expiration, then Katz could not
operate upon expiration to extend terms that the parties had not ex-
plicitly agreed to extend. Likewise, if states required bargaining over
which terms survive expiration, no state could adopt the general rule
of Katz to govern the post-expiration contract hiatus and extend CBA
terms past expiration. As discussed above, virtually all states with col-
lective bargaining have adopted the Katz rule.319 If the parties had to
bargain about the survivability of their wages, and failed to do so, no
state could use the Katz rule to require the employer to pay wages of
any kind. The reason is simple: if parties failed to bargain about the
maintenance of wages, then such continuation would not be part of
the existing agreement, or the status quo, and the failure to pay wages
therefore would not constitute a unilateral change of a condition of
employment.
Additionally, arguing that the survivability of terms is a
mandatory subject of bargaining results in a paradox where the
survivability of terms is simultaneously a term, and not a term of em-
ployment. To be a mandatory subject of bargaining, a provision gov-
erning the survivability of terms must constitute a term or condition of
employment, for it is neither wages nor hours.3 20 However, if the par-
ties fail to negotiate about the survivability of a term, then survivability
of that term is not a term or condition of employment because it is
not part of the existing agreement, and consequently, of the status
quo.
The two most recent jurisdictions to adopt the static status quo
rule relied on interpretations of their state's statutes to reach their
respective results.321 In short, both decisions were erroneous. In New
Hampshire, the parties amended their agreement to include a clause
that attempted to renew the contract annually until the parties ratified
a new agreement.3 22 The court held that the so-called evergreen
clause was a cost item,323 requiring approval by the "'legislative body
of the public employer.' '3 24 The school district never submitted the
318 Id. at 198.
319 See supra text accompanying notes 100-20.
320 See supra text accompanying notes 315-16.
321 See Board of Trustees v. Associated COLT Staff, 659 A.2d 842, 845-46 (Me. 1995); In
re Milton Sch. Dist., 625 A.2d 1056, 1058-61 (N.H. 1993).
322 See Milton, 625 A.2d at 1058.
323 I&
324 Id. at 1059 (quoting N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 273-k3, 11(b) (1987)).
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evergreen clause to the town for approval.3 25 The evergreen clause
does seem to be a cost item given a literal reading of the definition,
"'any benefit acquired through collective bargaining whose imple-
mentation requires an appropriation by the legislative body of the
public employer with which negotiations are being conducted.'
326
Because the contract obviously contains cost items, reasoned the ma-
jority, the clause that renews those items each year is a cost item as
well, and hence, is unenforceable.3 27 Without the evergreen clause,
the court held that the district need not pay step increases after the
previous agreement expired.328 The court then seemingly went on to
hold that even with an evergreen clause, the school board should not
have to pay step increases.3 29
As the dissent pointed out, the result of the majority's treatment
of the evergreen clause was nonsensical.330 The majority's holding,
which denied only the payment of step increases, allowed payment of
base salaries, health benefits, dental benefits, and for lunch duty.
3 3 '
Despite the court's reasoning, these items are also "cost items," as they
require appropriation from a legislative body for payment.3 32 Under
the majority's reasoning, because the evergreen clause governed these
items past expiration, and because the evergreen clause was an unap-
proved cost item, the school board should not make any of these pay-
ments either.333 Stated differently, the failure to include an approved
evergreen clause as part of the collective bargaining agreement pre-
vents teachers from receiving any payment for services after the agree-
ment expires.334 Given New Hampshire's prohibition of public
employee strikes,335 the legislature could not have intended that
teachers must work without any pay after expiration. In addition, the
majority acknowledges and adheres to the static status quo rule,
336
and the result that the majority's conclusion logically requires clearly
325 See i& at 1058.
326 Id. at 1058-59 (quoting N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:1, IV (1987)).
327 Milton, 625 A.2d at 1059.
328 Id
329 Id. at 1060-61 (holding, after discussing the Public Employee Labor Relations
Board's application of the static status quo rule, that "the district should not be required to
pay step increases after a CBA has expired").
330 Id. at 1062 (Brock, C.J., dissenting); supra text accompanying notes 286-89.
331 See id. at 1061 (concluding that "the district should not be required to pay step
increases after a CBA has expired and during the pendency of collective bargaining for a
new CBA"); id, (ruling, inexplicably, that lunch duty payment, part of the collective agree-
ment, for which teachers received $10 per duty, was not a cost item, and therefore the
school board was wrong to force teachers to do lunch duty without pay).
332 See it/ at 1063 (Brock, C.J., dissenting) (questioning the majority holding that the
paid lunch duty was not a cost item).
333 See i& at 1062 (Brock, C.J., dissenting).
334 See id. (Brock, C.J., dissenting).
335 N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 273-A.5, 11(e) (1987).
336 Milton, 625 A.2d at 1060-61.
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violates the duty to maintain the status quo, however that term is
defined.
If, despite an approved evergreen clause, the court would still
overturn a Public Employee Labor Relations Board ("PELRB") deci-
sion to require payment of steps, 33 7 such adherence to the static status
quo suffers from infirmities previously discussed.33 8 In short, "[i] n the
public sector, when a CBA has expired and negotiations for a succes-
sor agreement are ongoing, the parties must maintain the status quo,
i.e., the terms and conditions of employment set forth in the previous
agreement survive until the parties negotiate a change."339 If, alterna-
tively, the court would require the payment of step increases only if
the parties included an approved evergreen clause in the agreement,
then the court would, in effect, require the parties to negotiate about
which terms survive, if the teachers wish to receive any payment after
expiration.3 40 To compel such negotiation to extend the terms of the
agreement impermissibly abandons the duty of the parties to maintain
the status quo even without an evergreen clause. In other words, the
evergreen clause itself means nothing. It merely "reduces to writing
what was understood and accepted by both the board and the associa-
tion .... The 'evergreen' clause merely highlights the well-settled
principle that the status quo must be maintained while contract nego-
tiations for public employees ... are underway.
'341
Like the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court was misguided in its partial reliance on state statutes to
prevent the payment of step increases. In Board of Trustees v. Associated
COLT Staff,3 42 the court relied on a state statute which requires that in
negotiation, "'neither party shall be compelled to agree to a proposal
or be required to make a concession.' 3 43 The court found that pay-
ing wages "constitutes a substantial concession.., in direct contraven-
tion of the prohibition contained in [the state statute]."344 The
concern of the court, and the legislature, is "to protect the public fisc
from wage increases that were neither bargained for nor approved by
the employer."3
45
However, the legislature also requires bargaining in good faith, a
duty which mandates the preservation of the status quo.3 46 Preserving
337 In this case the PELRB found that the evergreen clause was enforceable and re-
quired the school district to pay step increases. See id. at 1058.
338 See supra text accompanying notes 297-320.
339 Milton, 625 A.2d at 1063 (Brock, CJ., dissenting).
340 See supra text accompanying notes 333-34.
341 Milton, 625 A.2d at 1063 (Brock, CJ., dissenting).
342 659 A.2d 842 (Me. 1995).
343 Id. at 845 (quoting ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1026(1) (C) (West 1988)).
344 Id. at 845.
345 1&
346 See i&. at 849 (Wathen, C.J., dissenting).
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the status quo of conditions to which the parties had previously
agreed is not the same as forcing a party to accept a term in negotia-
tion.3 4 7 Here, the employer has already agreed to pay employees ac-
cording to a certain salary schedule 34 8 -it is that contract term which
continues as the status quo. 49 Requiring payment of step increases
does not require the employer to accept any term which the appropri-
ate body has not already approved.350 If the court required the em-
ployer to include the same salary schedule terms in the new
agreement, that would constitute compelling a term in the negotia-
tion of an agreement. Because the majority failed to make this distinc-
tion, its holding is incorrect.
B. The Weakness of Approaches with a Strict Time Line
Attempting to avoid the preceding arguments altogether, some
states and commentators have proposed351 or implemented 52 a sys-
tem of strict time lines which seeks to avoid the status quo question
entirely. The idea is that if the state forces the parties to negotiate
within strict time lines, an agreement will never expire without a new
agreement in place to succeed it.3 5 3 Such systems are not the best
solution to the status quo dilemma for two reasons, both of which
concern local control of local decisions. First, a strict time line
removes local control over local matters and centralizes it in state au-
thority. Second, because such systems need binding arbitration to be
effective, they may leave the parties with an agreement that they did
not make themselves.
Management of schools and schools themselves are local in na-
ture.354 Furthermore, local control over schools is an essential and
important part of our public education system.35 5 A system that re-
347 See id. (Wathen, CJ., dissenting) (stating that "[t]here is a meaningful legal differ-
ence... between compelling an agreement, and preserving the status quo while the par-
ties are bargaining").
348 See id. at 844.
349 See iL at 847 (Wathen, CJ., dissenting) (arguing that "'it is the wage provision that is
frozen, not wages themselves'") (quoting the Maine Labor Relations Board in this case).
350 See iaL at 848 (Wathen, CJ., dissenting) ("The preservation of the status quo is an
attribute of bargaining in good faith, and it results in neither an agreement nor a conces-
sion."); id. (rejecting the employer's argument that paying step increases forces the em-
ployer to accept a wage increase to which it has not agreed).
351 See May, supra note 10, at 812-13 (advocating a strict time line, similar to those of
Connecticut and Iowa, for the settlement of new collective agreements in Vermont).
352 Connecticut and Iowa use such systems. See supra Part II.B.
353 See May, supra note 10, at 812 ("The sooner negotiations are completed, the less
need there would be for [a state's status quo rule] to be invoked.").
354 See Hogler & Thompson, supra note 33, at 468 (noting that "[t]raditionally, educa-
tion has remained primarily a function of local government, subject to the political process
at that level").
355 See Finch & Nagel, supra note 93, at 1578 ("No governmental function in the
United States has stronger traditions of local control than the provision of public educa-
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quires the parties to submit to state-mandated procedures to quickly
resolve differences removes the role that local political pressure can
and should play in school governance. 356 More explicitly, giving the
parties only a certain number of days to negotiate by themselves
before requiring them to submit to state procedures for resolving
their differences3 57 removes the process from the local political envi-
ronment. This shift can and should impact the strength and stances
of the parties in negotiation.358 If the parties are using too much time
or money in negotiation, or are making demands that the public finds
objectionable, the public, not the state, should place political pressure
on the parties to reach a quick and equitable agreement. The people
who want to be active in these matters5 59 need not wait until election
time for results. Instead, they should express their views by attending
board meetings or writing letters and making telephone calls to board
members or union negotiators. If the public fails to do so, then it
believes in the board's representative power to reflect their interests,
approves of the parties' proceedings, or demonstrates its indifference
about what occurs. Instead of allowing local citizens to impact the
decision, strict time lines insulate the process from the local political
environment by allowing the parties to negotiate in that environment
for only a short time before state-mandated procedures intervene.
The presence of binding arbitration in such schemes intensifies
the problem of a settlement's insularity from the public.360 In bind-
ing arbitration, after a certain number of impasse procedures fail, an
arbitrator makes a final determination about the terms of the new
agreement, which is eventually binding on the parties. 361 This proce-
dure is essential if strict time lines are to effectively avoid application
tion."); Smit, supra note 84, at 28 (noting that "[iwle pride ourselves on local control, in
contrast to centralized control typical of other nations").
356 See Smit, supra note 84, at 32 (declaring "we've got a public which believes in de-
mocracy and feels that it is supposed to be calling the shots regarding local control of
schools"); Gary M. Smit et al., The Impact of Mandatory Collective Bargaining Laws on a School
Board's Ability to Govern, Gov'T UNION REV., Spring 1983, at 3, 12-13 (discussing school
board members' contention that a state-mandated procedure for deciding between offers
will severely erode local control).
357 See supra note 159, text accompanying notes 161-70.
358 See Lieberman, supra note 31, at 60 (arguing that " [ i ]n large part, teacher bargain-
ing is a contest for public opinion").
359 See supra note 355; see also Finch & Nagel, supra note 93, at 1662-63 (noting that
although public turnout at school board functions is low, and attempts to encourage pub-
lic involvement have failed, citizens are interested in issues affecting tax burdens). One
issue affecting taxes is obviously the school district's salary burden. See id- at 1663 & n.341.
360 See Hogler & Thompson, supra note 33, at 469 (arguing that "present methods of
impasse resolution exacerbate the situation" of limited public involvement in bargaining).
361 See supra text accompanying notes 165-70.
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of the status quo doctrine. 362 If the parties proceed to an arbitrator
whose decision is not binding, then the parties can prolong the nego-
tiation indefinitely. This result would defeat the purpose of having a
strict time line with impasse procedures. 363 Furthermore, if by pro-
ceeding to non-binding arbitration the parties have exhausted im-
passe procedures and are at statutory impasse, then the employer can
make unilateral changes. These changes are permissible because the
status quo doctrine operates only until impasse.3 64 Thus, the em-
ployer would be free to implement changes to the mandatory subjects
of bargaining 65 as long as the employer has already offered them to
the union, and the union has rejected them.3 66 From that point, nego-
tiations would continue until either the parties reached a new agree-
ment, or the employer imposed a final offer.367 The latter outcome
would probably, if not inevitably, have negative effects on employee
morale. Of course, this outcome preserves local control, because the
parties eventually will reach their own agreement. However, a provi-
sion that contains only nonbinding arbitration defeats the goal of
strict time lines, namely, the facilitation of timely settlements. There-
fore, binding arbitration is an essential component of a system that
seeks to reach quick settlements and avoid the status quo rule
altogether.
The presence of a binding arbitration procedure in a strict time
line scheme is noteworthy because it prevents the parties from reach-
ing a joint decision. 368 In a bargaining relationship, the best agree-
362 See May, supra note 10, at 812 (recommending that legislation seeking to prevent
expiration of agreements without having a new agreement in place include a provision for
mandatory binding arbitration).
363 The Iowa system, for example, makes binding arbitration optional; that is, a party
must request to use it. If neither party so requests, the negotiation can proceed past the
expiration of a previous agreement. See supra note 159; see also Kathleen S. Herbert, Balanc-
ing Teachers" Collective Bargaining Rights with the Interests of School Districts, Students and Taxpay-
ers: Current Legislation Strikes Ou 99 DICK- L. REv. 57, 77 (1994) (explaining that without
the finality of binding arbitration, parties in Pennsylvania can adhere to negotiation time-
lines but still not reach a timely resolution).
364 For an explanation of what impasse means in the public sector, see sipra note 64.
365 A term or condition of employment, which Katz seeks to protect, is a mandatory
subject of bargaining. See Vienna Sch. Dist. No. 55 v. Illinois Educ. Labor Rel. Bd., 515
N.E.2d 476, 478-79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (discussing the Katz decision's protection of condi-
tions of employment and noting that "[a] term or condition of employment is something
provided by an employer which . . . has become a mandatory subject of bargaining[,
which] includes[ ] wages").
366 See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 745 (1962) (concluding that "even after an impasse
is reached [the employer] has no license to grant wage increases greater than any he has
ever offered the union at the bargaining table, for such action is necessarily inconsistent
with a sincere desire to conclude an agreement with the union").
367 See May, supra note 10, at 807.
368 See Hogler & Thompson, supra note 33, at 469 (asserting that "[i]f the dispute is
submitted to arbitration .... a third party with no stake in the outcome renders a decision
which vitally affects the educational process").
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ment is one that the parties reach themselves.8 69 Contrary to this
notion, in a binding arbitration decision, the parties will not have
reached agreement themselves, preventing local control over the reso-
lution of local contract issues.370 For his own state, Professor May ad-
mits that "any scheme of binding arbitration... cuts against the grain
of a valuable and revered Vermont tradition-local control. Commu-
nities may not be prepared to give up their ultimate control of the
negotiation process."371 Despite this concern, Professor May is willing
to impose contracts by finality to both ensure "a predictable end to
the process"3 72 and to "allow[ ] communities to focus more energy on
improving the quality of education offered in their schools, and less
on resolving labor strife."373 However, the terms that govern the oper-
ation of such a large portion of the school budget,374 and therefore
taxpayers' dollars, deserve as much local input and control as any
other issue of school governance. As a result of its importance in de-
termining how districts spend funds to support education, labor strife
is no less a local issue than any other issue that a school district faces.
Therefore, a strict time line culminating in binding arbitration is an
inappropriate means of resolving a dispute in negotiations.
Of course, binding arbitration has an additional advantage be-
yond avoiding the question raised by post-expiration step increases: it
prevents teacher strikes better than any other impasse procedure.375
369 See Gay M. Gilbert, Note, Dispute Resolution Techniques and Public Sector Collective Bar-
gaining, 2 OHIo ST. J. ON Dsp. RESOL. 287, 287-88 (1987) (arguing that the "most impor-
tant goal [of public sector bargaining statutes) is to retain the benefits of free collective
bargaining where the parties negotiate their own agreement in recognition of the fact that
the best agreement is usually one achieved voluntarily by the parties"); see alsoJuanJ. Perez,
Dispute Resolution Procedures in Public Employee Bargaining, 17 URB. LAw. 199, 227 (1985)
(concluding that "[plublic employers and employees.., should always bear in mind that
... it is they who will live with the... agreement" and, therefore, they "should strive to
reach a mutually acceptable agreement"). In addition, some evidence exists that negoti-
ated contracts are less costly than contracts settled by arbitration. See LEGiSLATIVE COMM'N
ON EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, MINN. LEGISLATURE, supra note 35, at 2 (finding that "[I] imited
data ... indicate that arbitration awards have tended to cost somewhat more than contracts
that are negotiated").
370 Michael Finch and Trevor Nagel assert that "one cannot fully credit the argument
that arbitration threatens local control, since public education is a state responsibility."
Finch & Nagel, supra note 93, at 1669-70. While education is a state, as opposed to federal,
responsibility, the authors themselves noted that local control characterizes education
more than any other governmental function, and concede that binding arbitration does
remove some local control over fiscal matters. Id. at 1578-79, 1669; see also supra note 355
(discussing local control over education).
371 May, supra note 10, at 813-14.
372 Id. at 814.
373 Id.
374 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
375 See JANET CURRIE & SHEENA MCCONNELL, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
LEGISLATION ON DISPUTES IN THE U.S. PUBLIC SECTOR: No PoLIcy MAY BE THE WORST PoLIcY
14 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 3978, 1992) (reporting that in
a research sample, "[t]he incidence of strikes... [was] lowest under compulsory arbitra-
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For this reason, communities may be content to have the bargaining
decision removed from local control. Despite the fact that only thir-
teen states authorize some form of public sector work stoppage,
376
strikes occur frequently even in states which forbid them.377 Intui-
tively, public sector strikes are destructive because they interrupt the
delivery of monopolistic government services. 378 Furthermore, such
strikes may force public officials to accept demands with negative fi-
nancial consequences in order to comply with public demands to re-
store public service.3 79 Nevertheless, both the thirteen states that
tion"); Chauhan, supra note 36, at 194 (stating that in response to strikes, arbitration is
considered a last viable step in resolving disputes); Finch & Nagel, supra note 93, at 1585
(calling binding arbitration "overwhelmingly successful" in preventing strikes); Smit et al.,
supra note 357, at 12 (proposing that final offer binding arbitration is a plausible choice for
officials interested in limiting strikes); Gilbert, supra note 369, at 290 (noting the lower
frequency of strikes with binding arbitration than with either fact-finding or mediation).
But see Chauhan, supra note 36, at 218 (concluding "[i]t is unrealistic to assume that [medi-
ation, fact finding, or arbitration will] be able to provide an effective substitute for the
strike").
376 See Chauhan, supra note 36, at 207 tbl.6 (at least some public employees have some
limited right to strike in Alaska, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin); see also LEAP, supra note
8, at 643 (stating that, in most states, public employees have no legal right to strike); M.
Susan Rueschhoff, Public Sector Interest Arbitration: An Examination of Relevant Normative Prem-
ises and a Test of Underlying Assumptions, in STRATEoIES FOR IMPASSE RESOLUriON, supra note
18, at 145, 145 (noting that "[i]n many cases, the use of strikes to resolve... impasses is
illegal").
377 See Chauhan, supra note 36, at 206 (suggesting that a ban on public employee
strikes does not work); id. at 209 (noting that strikes in public employment occur even in
states that forbid them); R. Wilburn Clouse & Frank Fudesco, Why Some Teachers Choose Not
to Strike, in STRATEGIES FOR IMPASSE RESOLUTION, supra note 18, at 283, 285 (noting that
teachers frequently use strikes to resolve impasses); Finch & Nagel, supra note 93, at 1583
(noting that notwithstanding prohibitions, teachers do strike); Myron Lieberman, Reflec-
tions on the Rationales for Teacher Bargaining, Gov'T UNION REv., Spring 1992, at 1, 6 (stating
that "a statutory prohibition of teacher strikes is no assurance that teacher strikes will not
occur frequently"); Robert D. Pursley, An Analysis of Permissible Strike Authorization Among
Public Workers, in STRATEaIES FOR IMPASSE RESOLUTION, supra note 18, at 101, 113 (conclud-
ing that strike problems in the public sector are found in states where they are unlawful).
See generally SELDEN, supra note 27 (documenting the history of teacher strikes and the facts
of several prominent teacher strikes).
378 See DENHOLM, supra note 8, at 7 (calling the public sector strike "unilaterally disrup-
tive of the normal political process" because the union can legally "deprive the rest of
society of an essential service"); LEMAP, supra note 8, at 644 tbl.17-3 (listing arguments
against public sector strikes, including the lack of alternative sources for services); Hogler
& Thompson, supra note 33, at 459 (citing the argument that a public sector strike with-
holds services from the public); Neal, supra note 9, at 97 (asserting that public sector
strikes are inappropriate because public employees deliver essential government services);
Rueschhoff, supra note 376, at 147 (stating that arguments against public sector strikes rest
on the idea that public sector services are essential to the public). But cf. KERCHNER &
MITCHELL, supra note 12, at 187 (arguing that the argument that teacher strikes deprive
children of their education is "little more than emotional rhetoric," given already common
school schedule disruptions).
379 See DENHOLM, supra note 8, at 16 (asserting that public sector strikes "give[ ] the
union disproportionate power and results in government decisions which have short-term
political benefits and disastrous long-term consequences").
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allow strikes and some commentators believe that the disadvantages of
binding arbitration outweigh the practice's effective prevention of
strikes.380 First, the prospect of binding arbitration may "chill" negoti-
ation from the beginning.8 81 Typically, an arbitrator will not make an
award outside the boundaries of the parties' final offers.38 2 This ex-
pectation gives the parties an incentive to make many demands and
hold to them firmly, secure in the knowledge that they will get at least
some preferable terms in the award.383 Over time, this incentive can
destroy the bargaining process completely, resulting in what commen-
tators have called the "narcotic effect."38 4 Instead of engaging in diffi-
cult and active bargaining that promotes development of a bargaining
relationship, the parties will prefer to proceed to the easier and auto-
matic arbitration process.38 5 Second, most school boards dislike bind-
380 See id. at 17 (arguing that "[i]f anything, binding arbitration is worse than strikes").
Traditionally, binding arbitration and other impasse procedures are the public sector sub-
stitute for the right to strike which exists in the private sector. See PERRY & WitsM'A, supra
note 25, at 92 (noting that as of 1970, the book's publication date, states had not seriously
considered binding arbitration in the public sector, but that they appealed to boards of
education as a means to solve their inability to deal with strikes); Befort, supra note 70, at
1271 (explaining that "[miost public sector bargaining laws contain mandatory impasse
resolution procedures as a partial replacement for the right to strike"); Chauhan, supra
note 36, at 219 (stating that the government has adopted various procedures to avoid
strikes by mutual agreement or by using a third party); Finch & Nagel, supra note 93, at
1582 (declaring that teachers, denied the right to strike, must accept other procedures
instead); Gilbert, supra note 369, at 301 ("In most jurisdictions, mediation, fact-finding,
and interest arbitration are considered strike substitutes.").
381 Rueschhoff, supra note 376, at 146 (explaining the so-called "chilling effect," where
"parties become reluctant to make concessions and move from their initial positions on the
belief that the more self-serving their position at the point of impasse, the closer the neu-
tral third party's decision will be to their preferred position"). A procedure known as final-
offer arbitration, under which an arbitrator may choose only the entire final offer of one of
the parties, may solve this problem. See PIsKuUcH, supra note 17, at 44 (noting that final
offer arbitration was designed to respond to concerns about the chilling and narcotic ef-
fects of arbitration). Under final-offer arbitration, parties may bargain in the hope that the
arbitrator will deem their offer the more reasonable one. See Chauhan, supra note 36, at
194-96 (discussing various types of arbitration); Gilbert, supra note 369, at 291 (discussing
attributes of final-offer arbitration that remove the negative effects of traditional arbitra-
tion on the bargaining process).
382 See DENHOLM, supra note 8, at 17 (stating that arbitrators will not make awards for
"anything less than management's final offer").
383 See Hogler & Thompson, supra note 33, at 457-58 (relating threat of arbitration to
the negotiation process "when employees increase their demands and employers lower
their offers, knowing the arbitration decision will fall somewhere between both offers");
Perez, supra note 369, at 224 (documenting Connecticut's use of binding arbitration and
the parties' reliance "on the arbitration procedure to write their collective bargaining
agreement"); Rueschhoff, supra note 376, at 146 (pertinent passage quoted supra note
381); Gilbert, supra note 369, at 290-91 (explaining the "chilling effect").
384 Rueschhoff, supra note 376, at 147 (noting that the "narcotic effect addresses bar-
gaining problems that occur over time," as opposed to the "chilling effect," which occurs
within a single bargaining round).
385 See id. (explaining that the narcotic effect is "a trend in behavior when either or
both parties decide that it is easier, less costly and time-consuming, or more outcome-
advantageous to substitute the [arbitration] process in place of the bargaining process");
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ing arbitration because it renders school governance more difficult by
removing the critical financial decisions from the board's control.
38 6
As a corollary to this problem, and perhaps more disturbing, the par-
ties' removal from the ultimate decisionmaking in the bargaining pro-
cess allows them "to disavow responsibility for an unfavorable award
since they are able to direct blame at the arbitration process."38 7
For these reasons, despite its effectiveness in preventing strikes,
the disadvantages of binding arbitration, the last step in the strict time
line approach, outweigh its benefits. Moreover, as a result of the dis-
satisfaction with binding arbitration, school boards have shown some
preference for granting employees the right to strike, despite the dis-
ruption it causes.3 88
Gilbert, supra note 369, at 291 (stating that the "narcotic effect" of arbitration makes par-
ties dependent on the arbitration process rather than on bargaining); see also LEAP, supra
note 8, at 644 tbl.17-3 (recognizing the argument that dispute resolution techniques do
not encourage meaningful negotiation); PERRY & WirmMAN, supra note 25, at 91 (noting
that, at least in the private sector, "[t]he long-run efficiency of binding arbitration as a
mandated substitute for the strike is limited by the fact that it tends to undermine collec-
tive bargaining and encourage bargaining impasses"); Chauhan, supra note 36, at 210
(quoting a statement by former Detroit Mayor Coleman Young that binding arbitration
destroys collective bargaining); Perez, supra note 369, at 224-25 (stating the argument that
final-offer arbitration encourages its own use, in effect "becom[ing] a crutch for the par-
ties" because the parties can do no worse than the opposing party's final offer). But see
PIsKuIjcH, supra note 17, at 44 (finding that research "provides little or no support for the
hypothesis that arbitration is habit forming"); Rueschhoff, supra note 376, at 146 (discuss-
ing an argument that arbitration promotes bargaining because parties would rather bar-
gain than risk a poor arbitration decision, thereby enhancing bargaining).
386 See DENHOLM, supra note 8, at 17 (calling binding arbitration a "'no lose' proposi-
tion for the unions" and claiming that "[b]inding arbitration completely removes elected
officials from the process"); Chauhan, supra note 36, at 194 (noting that unions, not man-
agement have pressed for arbitration laws); Finch & Nagel, supra note 93, at 1627 (noting
that while employees favor arbitration, local government usually opposes it because it
heightens the loss of control that employers already feel with collective bargaining); Don-
aid E. Pursell & William D. Torrence, The Impact of Compulsory Arbitration on Municipal Budg-
ets-The Case of Omaha, Nebraska, in STRANEGIEs FOR IMPASSE RESOLUTION, supra note 18, at
243, 248 (concluding that arbitration awards resulted in disruption of the budget process,
making budgets more complex and uncomfortable to manage); Steven B. Rynecki & Wil-
liam C. Pickering, Educational Reform and Its Labor Relations Impact from a Management Perspec-
tive, 13 J.L. & EDuc. 477, 504 (1984) (discussing employers' reasons for resistance to
binding arbitration); Smit et al., supra note 356, at 12-13 (stating that where districts use
binding arbitration, board members "may tend to perceive the bargaining process as hav-
ing a greater negative impact on their ability to govern"); id. at 13 (finding that, in Wiscon-
sin, final offer arbitration undermines the board's authority, especially in fiscal control).
But see Pursell & Torrence, supra, at 248 (concluding that while arbitration awards dis-
rupted the budget process, there was no erosion of the city's control over budgets).
Although this may have been true, the authors acknowledge that the arbitration awards
causedjuggling of expenditures and "budget overruns," which resulted in "much anguish
to city administrators." Id.
387 Perez, supra note 369, at 224.
388 See PISKULuCH, supra note 17, at 45 (discussing the view that strikes are a natural part
of the bargaining process, and the states that have allowed it in the public sector have
apparently followed such thinking); Befort, supra note 70, at 1273-74 (arguing that grant-
ing a limited right to strike instead of arbitration would allow an employer to make unilat-
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C. The Conformance of the Dynamic Status Quo Rule to the
Language of Katz
The dynamic status quo rule is the superior approach to the post-
expiration step increase problem, because it comports with the lan-
guage of Katz and lacks the shortcomings of the static status quo and
time line approaches.3s9 In order to establish that school boards
should pay step increases after expiration, the step increases must first
be a condition of employment. If they are not, then Katz does not
protect them. °90 There is no doubt that step increases, as an element
of wages, are a condition of employment, and constitute a mandatory
subject of bargaining. Salary schedules, along with their correspond-
ing step increases, determine the wage one earns.391 The salary sched-
ule and the step increase provision, not the exact wage, are the
conditions that govern employment under the agreement.3 92 The
eral change at an earlier point and would "ease concerns about the chilling effect of
compulsory arbitration and its lack of political accountability") (footnote omitted);
Chauhan, supra note 36, at 209-10 (noting that "both labor and management in the public
sector are no longer highly polarized on the issue of the right to strike," and discussing
instances in Dayton, Ohio, where city officials, who opposed the use of binding arbitration
because of its cost, contended that a strike is a better alternative, and in Detroit, Michigan,
where the mayor argued that binding arbitration destroys collective bargaining and causes
more damage than the strike law prevents); Finch & Nagel, supra note 93, at 1586 (explain-
ing that because of the theoretical conflict between binding arbitration and "traditions
both of educational governance and labor relations", some local government officials have
reassessed their opposition to public sector strikes and have concluded that "recognition of
a teacher's right to strike is preferable to a state-imposed duty to arbitrate"); id at 1669
(concluding that "local government... pay[s] a moderate ... cost under binding arbitra-
tion" and conceding that while local government will not surrender "important managerial
prerogatives to arbitrators," it does lose "some fiscal control" as a result of arbitration). But
see CURRIE & MCCONNELL, supra note 375, at 19 (asserting that arbitration is much less
costly than a typical strike).
389 See supra Parts lI.A-B; infra text accompanying notes 393-94; infra Part III.D.
390 By its own language, Katz protects employees from "an employer's unilateral
change in conditions of employment under negotiation." See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736,
743 (1962). Later courts construed this statement to include only mandatory subjects of
bargaining. SeeJackson Community College Classified & Technical Ass'n v. Jackson Com-
munity College, 468 N.W.2d 61, 63-64 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that wages are
mandatory subjects of bargaining that survive expiration until impasse).
391 SeeVienna Sch. Dist. No. 55 v. Illinois Educ. Labor Rel. Bd., 515 N.E.2d 476, 479-80
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (finding that because the salary increases were "an established practice,
... [t]he salary increments.., were clearly a term and condition of employment which
were unilaterally altered during contract negotiations").
392 See Indiana Educ. Employment Rel. Bd. v. Mill Creek Classroom Teachers Ass'n,
456 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind. 1983) (concluding that because the salary increases were part of
the contract, the school board was required to maintain the status quo of the salary sched-
ule and the increments); Board of Trustees v. Associated COLT Staff, 659 A.2d 842, 847-48
(Me. 1995) (Wathen, CJ., dissenting) (arguing that the university had the duty to continue
paying its employees annual step increases for wages included in an expired collective
bargaining agreement); Galloway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Galloway Township Educ.
Ass'n, 393 A.2d 218, 230 (NJ. 1978) (reasoning that "[i]ndisputably, the amount of an
employee's compensation is an important condition of his employment" and if a sched-
uled increase is an existing condition in the agreement, then unilateral denial of it is a
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terms of payment to which the parties agreed, not a fixed, unchanging
wage from year to year, survive expiration.3 93 The methods of applica-
tion of the dynamic status quo rule preserve the conditions of employ-
ment after expiration, thereby preventing unilateral change, as Katz
directs. The following section develops this idea.
D. How the Dynamic Status Quo Rule Works-Proper Methods
of Applying the Rule
Courts use two basic, and similar, forms of analysis to apply the
dynamic status quo rule. Each method reveals that the dynamic status
quo preserves the conditions of employment under the agreement.
Because of this accomplishment, the rule more accurately reflects the
Katz doctrine than the static status quo rule, which fails to protect the
terms as written in the agreement.
1. Discretionary Versus Automatic Increases
One method of applying the dynamic status quo rule flows di-
rectly from the language of Katz, which differentiates between auto-
matic and discretionary wage increases. 394 In Katz, the employer
granted discretionary merit raises to employees during negotia-
tions.3 95 Because the raises were not automatic, they did not consti-
tute part of the status quo, for they changed the conditions of
employment for employees who received raises.396 Automatic raises,
on the other hand, are part of the status quo because they "'do not
represent actual changes in conditions of employment[,] but.., they
perpetuate existing terms and conditions of employment.' 397 There-
fore, in Katz, the employer could have legally granted raises that were
automatic. 398 However, in the typical step increase situation, the em-
ployer seeks to withhold raises, not grant them. Hence, "if the unilat-
violation of the duty to bargain in good faith); Fairview Sch. Dist. v. Commonwealth Unem-
ployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 454 A.2d 517, 521 (Pa. 1982) (Larsen, J., dissent-
ing) ("The status quo in this case... was the payment of Fairview School District teachers
pursuant to the 1978-79 salary schedule contained in the expired agreement, and that
salary schedule includes increases in compensation based upon years of service."); Davis
Unified Sch. Dist., [Transfer Binder 4] Cal. Pub. Employee Rep. (Labor Rel. Press)
11031, at 121, 123 (Cal. Pub. Employment Rel. Bd. Feb. 22, 1980) ("The status quo was not
the dollar amount paid to each employee onJuly 1, 1977. The status quo was that employ-
ees would obtain salary increases each fail if they met certain requirements.").
393 See supra text accompanying notes 297-313.
394 Kat, 369 U.S. at 746-47.
395 Id. at 745-46.
396 See Galloway, 393 A.2d at 230 (finding that parties should resolve discretionary
raises in negotiations, and that discretionary raises are not part of the status quo).
397 &L at 231 (quoting NLRB v. John Zink Co., 551 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1977)).
398 Katz, 369 U.S. at 746 (reasoning that the granting of raises is "tantamount to an
outright refusal to negotiate" unless the raises were automatic and, therefore, part of the
status quo).
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eral grant of an automatic scheduled increase is not unlawful
[because it constitutes part of the status quo], then the withholding of
that same increase would be an unlawful unilateral change in the sta-
tus quo. '399 In sum, if the raises are truly discretionary, then they do
not constitute part of the status quo, and the employer may deny
them; alternatively, if the raises are automatic, as most step increases
are, the employer must grant them as part of the status quo. This ex-
ception amounts to little more than a restatement of the original rule:
if the raises are part of the status quo, the employer must grant them.
The controversy in determining whether an employer has the
duty to pay step increases under this formulation of the rule occurs in
its application. When are raises automatic and when are they discre-
tionary? Raises conditioned only on the commencement of a new
year of service are unquestionably automatic, for the employer has no
discretion to grant or withhold them during the agreement. 400 How-
ever, raises conditioned on other requirements are subject to debate.
For example, in Portland Community College,401 the agreement provided
that faculty members would advance on the salary schedule if they
demonstrated "satisfactory performance and progress towards comple-
tion of professional improvement requirements."40 2 The dissenting
member of the Oregon Employment Relations Board viewed these re-
quirements as discretionary increases, and, therefore not part of the
status quo.40 3 Flatly contradicting the dissent, the Board's majority
viewed the raises as automatic for those teachers who met the require-
ments; therefore, the board had to grant increases to those
teachers. 40
4
In resolving such automatic/discretionary conflicts, the majority's
approach is the correct one. Under the status quo doctrine, the con-
ditions that governed the employment relationship survive expira-
tion.40 5 These conditions include whatever terms regulate the
granting of step increases. If such an increase requires a satisfactory
evaluation from the previous year, however measured, then that re-
399 Galloway, 393 A.2d at 231.
400 See id& (noting that the Public Employment Relations Commission "ruled that upon
the start of a new school year, which was the only condition precedent to a 'step-up' in the
salary schedule, the teachers were entitled to payment of a salary at the next step"). The
Supreme Court of New Jersey did not disagree with this ruling, but held in favor of the
teachers on different grounds based on an interpretation of state statutes. See id. at 230-32.
401 9 Pub. Employer Collective Bargaining Rep. (Lab. Law Pub.) 9018 (Or. Employ-
ment Rel. Bd. Sept. 1986).
402 Id at 9019.
403 Id. at 9032 (Ellis, Chairman, dissenting).
404 Id at 9027-28.
405 See supra text accompanying notes 131-39; see also supra text accompanying notes
297-313 (noting that the terms of payment to which the parties agreed survive expiration);
supra Part III.C (same).
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quirement survives expiration. 40 6 In order to maintain the status quo,
the board must grant a step increase to all teachers who received a
satisfactory evaluation. Teachers whose evaluations were abysmal, on
the other hand, would not receive an increase, because they would
not earn one under the terms of the agreement. If an agreement pro-
vides that the board will use its discretion to grant increases, based on
whatever reason its members desire, then the board can determine
that no one will receive a raise, and remain in compliance with the
conditions of the expired agreement. Thus, the proper application of
the Katz automatic/discretionary analysis reflects the parties' mainte-
nance of the conditions which governed employment under the
agreement.
2. The Established Practice and Expectations of the Parties Analysis
Before granting step increases under the dynamic status quo rule,
some jurisdictions require that the employees have an expectation of
receiving an increase based on practices the school district established
during the life of the agreement.40 7 Like the automatic/discretionary
distinction, this is another way of analyzing the basic requirement that
only the conditions of employment that governed the life of the agree-
ment will survive expiration. If the district did not follow a practice of
granting step raises during the life of the agreement, then step in-
creases are not a condition of employment, and not part of the status
quo. If they were part of the normal practice, the step increase provi-
sion should survive. In this way, analysis used to apply the dynamic
status quo rule demonstrates that the rule properly reflects and inter-
prets the language of Katz.
406 Typically, school building administrators perform staff evaluations. For this reason,
determining whether or not a teacher performs satisfactorily is not within the discretion of
the school board, the party who grants the raises.
407 See Vienna Sch. Dist. No. 55 v. Illinois Educ. Labor Rel. Bd., 515 N.E.2d 476, 479
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987) ("[Iun determining the status quo, it is necessary to consider the rea-
sonable expectations of the employees in the continuance of existing terms and conditions
of employment.") (citing Indiana Educ. Employment Rel. Bd. v. Mill Creek Classroom
Teachers Ass'n, 456 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind. 1983)); Nassau County Sch. Bd., [Transfer
Binder 8] Fla. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 13206, at 390, 391 (Fla. Pub. Em-
ployment Rel. Comm'n Apr. 30, 1982) ("The objective expectation of employees in the
continuance of existing terms and conditions of their employment is the most important
factor in determining the status quo."); Town of Chatham, 21 Mass. Lab. Rel. Rep. (New
England Legal Pub.) 1526, 1531 (Mass. Labor Rel. Comm'nJan. 5, 1995) ("[T]he Commis-
sion analyzes the combination of facts upon which the alleged practice is predicated, in-
cluding whether the practice has occurred with regularity over a sufficient period of time,
so that it is reasonable to expect that the practice will continue.").
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E. Objections to the Dynamic Status Quo Rule
Seeking to prevent its adoption, critics of the dynamic status quo
rule argue that its application would create funding difficulties408 and
changes in the balance of bargaining power.40 9 However, neither of
these objections to the dynamic status quo rule has merit.
1. Financial Objections to the Dynamic Status Quo Rule
In contrast to this interpretation of the status quo rule, govern-
ment employers will contend that funding the desired increases is un-
fair and creates the hardship of funding wage increases that they have
neither approved nor accounted for in the budget.410 However, the
amount of money necessary to fund step increases after expiration is
not difficult to determine. According to Professor May, "[i]t is a sim-
ple matter to calculate the cost to a school district of paying automatic
salary step increases. One need only know the pay-scale step struc-
ture, where each teacher is on the scale, and which teachers will re-
turn for a new academic year. '41 ' To some extent, the figure will be
an estimate, given the placement on the schedule of new staff mem-
bers. However, for several reasons, school boards must commonly es-
timate whether they have enough money for salaries every year, even
under an active agreement. For example, the salary figure will change
depending on which teachers return for another year. Sometimes,
town voters defeat school budgets, which prevents the school board
from knowing precisely what they have to spend.41 2 Furthermore, a
school district may not be able to formulate an accurate budget if the
state determines aid amounts after the board presents its budget for
acceptance. 41
3
408 See infra notes 410, 414 and accompanying text.
409 See supra text accompanying notes 299-304.
410 See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Associated COLT Staff, 659 A.2d 842, 845 (Me. 1995)
(arguing that (1) requiring payment of steps "places on the University the burden of fund-
ing wage increases not budgeted for," and (2) the legislature wanted "to protect the public
fisc from wage increases that were neither bargained for nor approved by the public em-
ployer"); In re Milton Sch. Dist., 625 A.2d 1056, 1059 (N.H. 1993) (holding unenforceable
a clause arguably requiring payment of steps because it was a "cost item" the town had not
approved).
411 May, supra note 10, at 770. May does indicate that other benefits which survive
expiration, such as health and dental benefits, "[s]lightly complicat[e] the picture" and
make the figure more difficult to estimate. Id. Nevertheless, the task is far from difficult.
Consider the following- "The step increase.., is nothing more than a matrix upon which
the salaries of those teachers who stay in the system are ratcheted up to a higher step based
upon years of service." Milton, 625 A.2d at 1064 (Brock, C.J., dissenting).
412 See May, supra note 10, at 754 n.5 (documenting the increasing frequency with
which towns refuse to pass school budgets).
413 See id at 755 nn.8-9 (explaining that Vermont towns usually have school district
meetings in March at which the board must present a budget for approval even though the
state will not provide final aid figures until May orJune).
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In addition to the difficulty of determining the amount necessary
to fund step increases, some parties cite financial hardship as the rea-
son they cannot pay them. 414 However, the assumption that payment
of step increases during negotiation will cost the employer additional
funds is false in many cases. "[G] iven the fact that bargained-for raises
are generally paid retroactively to the expiration date of the prior con-
tract, the actual out-of-pocket cost to the school district is not as great
as might first appear. '415 Additionally, when parties agree to contract
terms, neither party knows if step increases will cost districts more or
less money from year to year. Chief Justice Brock of the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire explains:
The majority assumes that the step increase provision will nec-
essarily cost the district more money.... The cost effect of the step
increase, of course, cannot be determined until all teacher con-
tracts are signed for the following year. As teachers leave the system
by retirement or transfer to other school districts, their salary slots
presumably will give way to new personnel coming in at the entry
level. Whether such transition or turnover results in a greater or
lesser expenditure than the previous year was an unknown factor at
the time of the [renewal] clause's adoption.
416
Perhaps most importantly, even if paying step increases after expira-
tion causes the district to pay higher salaries than it did in any year
under the agreement, financial hardship is not an acceptable reason
for a school board to refuse to pay step increases without first negoti-
ating to impasse.417 When the parties craft an agreement, they assent
to the terms of that agreement until the completion of a new agree-
ment. This is precisely what adherence to the status quo requires.41 8
The goal of the status quo rule is not to save money, but to preserve
conditions of employment so parties will bargain in good faith.419 For
414 See Milton, 625 A.2d at 1064 (listing the school district's severe financial hardships
and describing the drastic cost-saving measures the district took even before the agreement
expired).
415 May, supra note 10, at 811.
416 Milton, 625 A.2d at 1064 (Brock, CJ., dissenting).
417 See Board of Trustees v. Associated COLT Staff, 659 A.2d 842, 849 (Me. 1995)
(Wathen, CJ., dissenting) (arguing that although the results of maintaining the status quo
are "most pronounced in time of financial crisis," such concerns are best suited for legisla-
tive consideration and do not justify "a judicially-crafted hardship exception to the duty to
bargain").
418 See Milton, 625 A.2d at 1064 (Brock, CJ., dissenting) (discussing the district's severe
financial hardship during the year of the agreement's expiration and calling "improper"
the school board's failure to grant a step increase as a cost-cutting measure); id.
(" '[W]henever the employer by promises or by a course of conduct has made a particular
benefit part of the established wage or compensation system, then he is not at liberty uni-
laterally to change this benefit either for better or worse during.., the period of collective
bargaining.'") (alterations in original) (quoting NLRB v. Dothan Eagle, Inc., 434 F.2d 93,
98 (5th Cir. 1970)).
419 See supra text accompanying notes 64, 132.
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these reasons, the financial objections to paying step increases after
expiration are insufficient to reject adherence to the dynamic status
quo rule.
2. The Bargaining Power Objection to the Dynamic Status Quo Rule
Part of the opposition to the dynamic status quo rule rests on the
notion that requiring the school board to pay step increases gives the
teachers an advantage in negotiation.420 This concern drove Oregon
to adopt a "balance of power" exception to the dynamic status quo
rule for a particular period of years.42' The balance of power con-
cern, as applied to employers, misconceives the role of the status quo
doctrine. 422 In addition, protecting the balance of bargaining power
also affects teachers in a different and more harmful way than school
boards.
Where the school corporation has consistently paid incremental
wage increases based merely upon years of service ... , employees
still reasonably expect their accrued wage increases even though ne-
gotiations for a new agreement are pending. If school [boards] are
not required to pay the increments, they are free to use the incre-
ments as a bargaining tool.
For instance, an employer may be encouraged to prolong nego-
tiations past the expiration of the existing agreement to gain bar-
gaining leverage .... The employees would be deprived of the
present use of the increments to their salary even though they may
later recover these increments as part of a new contract. 423
Stated differently, this gives rise to an unfairness to the teachers which
does not apply to school boards if they must pay step increases. For
the teachers to deserve step increases after expiration under the dy-
namic status quo rule, payment of step increases must be included in
the expired agreement. If, under the expired agreement, the school
board did not pay step increases, then the increases are not part of the
agreement, and therefore, neither a condition of employment nor an
420 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, for example, views the static status quo
rule as "essential to preserving 'the balance of power.'" Milton, 625 A.2d at 1060 (quoting
Appeal of Franklin Educ. Ass'n, 616 A.2d 919, 922 (N.H. 1992)).
421 See supra text accompanying notes 300-01.
422 See supra text accompanying notes 300-06.
423 Indiana Educ. Employment Rel. Bd. v. Mill Creek Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 456
N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind. 1983); see also Nassau County Sch. Bd., [Transfer Binder 8] Fla. Pub.
Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 13206, at 390, 391 (Fla. Pub. Employment Rel. Comm'n
Apr. 30, 1982) (concluding that where collective bargaining agreements have included
step increases, the better rule is to require payment of step increases after expiration, be-
cause to do otherwise encourages the employer to prolong negotiations to gain bargaining
leverage through the withholding of step increases).
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element of the status quo.4 24 In such circumstances, the board will
not have to pay step increases after expiration. On the other hand,
when increases are part of the expired agreement, the dynamic status
quo rule merely requires the board to adhere to the condition of em-
ployment to which it agreed when it made the contract.425 Such a re-
quirement does not grant teachers any extra bargaining leverage, for
it simply maintains the relationship which, pursuant to the parties'
agreement, existed previously. Therefore, requiring payment of step
increases in these circumstances does not compromise the teachers'
duty to bargain in good faith.426 In contrast, if the expired agreement
contains a salary schedule and provisions for step increases, the static
status quo rule will result in the deprivation of step increases which
the parties had included as a condition of employment in the agree-
ment. Hence, these step increases would be part of the status quo.
F. Allowance of Employer Defenses and Freedom of the Parties
to Avoid the Dynamic Status Quo Rule by Express
Agreement
Although the dynamic status quo rule is superior to the static sta-
tus quo rule, a per se rule that requires the payment of step increases
for all teachers any time a contract contains a salary schedule is too
broad. First, a salary increase, even with a salary schedule, may de-
pend on factors such as satisfactory evaluations or "progress [in] pro-
fessional improvement requirements."427 Second, the prominence of
local control over education 428 dictates that the interpretation of an
agreement should reflect the expectations of the parties as embodied
in their agreement. 429 A statewide rule requiring the payment of step
increases in every circumstance may impermissibly neglect local con-
trol over an agreement in the same way that strict time lines forsake
424 Katz protects only conditions of employment. See supra note 390 and accompany-
ing text. If the collective agreement makes no provision for step increases, then they are
not a condition of employment, and the status quo doctrine does not protect them.
425 See supra Parts III.C-D.
426 For this reason, the dynamic status quo rule does not subvert the purpose of the
status quo doctrine. The maintenance of both bargaining power and the status quo work
together in this context. This tandem differentiates the teachers' position from that of the
school board, for even if the bargaining power concern, as applied to the employer, main-
tains equal bargaining positions, it subverts the purpose of the status quo rule by allowing
the employer to make a unilateral change in violation of the duty to bargain in good faith.
See supra text accompanying notes 305-10.
427 See supra text accompanying note 402.
428 See supra text accompanying notes 354-55.
429 See Vienna Sch. Dist. No. 55 v. Illinois Educ. Labor Rel. Bd., 515 N.E.2d 476, 479
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987) ("in determining the status quo, it is necessary to consider the reason-
able expectations of the employees in the continuance of existing terms and conditions of
employment") (citing Indiana Educ. Employment Rel. Bd. v. Mill Creek Classroom Teach-
ers Ass'n, 456 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind. 1983)).
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local input in the negotiation process. If the parties know that the
state courts will always require the payment of step increases after ex-
piration, the courts will have essentially handcuffed local school dis-
tricts by preventing them from negotiating for a different
arrangement. To some extent, this knowledge would, in effect, pre-
clude districts and unions from controlling their own negotiations.
Therefore, courts must recognize a few exceptions to a blanket appli-
cation of the dynamic status quo rule.
1. Contracting Out of the Dynamic Status Quo Rule by Express
Agreement
Even if an agreement has a salary schedule and step increases, the
parties should be able to contract out of the dynamic static quo rule to
avoid the limitation on local control.430 Such an arrangement in the
bargaining agreement should state the following:
Upon expiration of this agreement, on [month, day, year], the
school board and the association agree that the employer will not
pay teachers step raises according to the salary schedule herein;
rather, for the period, if any, of negotiations after expiration of this
agreement, teachers will receive exactly the same salary they earned
when the agreement expired. Any adjustment to that salary will be
part of the new agreement the parties reach.
Allowing the parties to write such a clause, and enforcing it, gives
them an opportunity to bargain about the rule they wish to use to
govern this situation. However, this clause is a permissive, not
mandatory, subject of bargaining.431 For this reason, the employer
may bring up the subject, and offer concessions for the clause, but the
employer cannot insist on the clause to the point of impasse.432
2. Limiting the Duration of the Salary Schedule and the Entire
Agreement
The insertion of a time limitation in the salary clause itself is an-
other possible way to avoid the dynamic status quo rule through ex-
press agreement. The New York PERB allowed an employer to avoid
salary increases because the agreement contained a clause limiting de-
termination of base salaries to the four years governed by the con-
430 See May, supra note 10, at 770 (stating that "teachers and school boards can, by
negotiation, eliminate the automatic post-expiration step increase practice"); id at 811
("[B] oards are free to propose to association bargainers that they ... even explicitly waive
any right to post-expiration step movement as part of any future contract.").
431 See supra text accompanying notes 316-21.
432 See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (holding
that good faith bargaining does not permit refusal to enter an agreement on the ground
that it does not include a proposal which is a permissive subject of bargaining).
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tract.43 3 The PERB determined that this language "clearly and
unambiguously expresse [d] the intent of the parties that the salary
grid be limited to the four academic years covered by the contract."
43 4
The parties could have been clearer about their intentions. Although
the clause limited the determination of salaries to a four-year period,
it included no provision regarding a determination of salaries after
that period expired. In contrast, the clause suggested in the preced-
ing subsection specifies a salary level during post-expiration negotia-
tions.435 Nevertheless, the clause the parties included operated to
prevent payment of step increases after expiration because the con-
tract specifically tied the time restriction to the salary grid itself.
43 6
In a related situation, courts properly do not allow a defense to
the dynamic status quo rule if a term limits the duration of the agree-
ment, and not the salary step provisions specifically, to specified dates.
For example, in a case before the California PERB, the agreement
contained a clause limiting the entire agreement to a twelve-month
period.43 7 Rejecting the argument that this limitation waived the
teachers' right to step increases after expiration, the Board reasoned:
[W] e will find a waiver only when there is an intentional relinquish-
ment of these rights, expressed in clear and unmistakable terms.
There is no indication in the agreement that by obtaining a contrac-
tual right to continued employment policies for a specified period,
[the union] intended to relinquish its statutory right to an un-
changed status quo pending negotiations, thereby waiving the right
to negotiate proposed changes.
438
This decision is correct for a practical reason. If the school board's
interpretation of the clause were correct, then after the agreement's
expiration, the teachers would receive neither their salaries nor bene-
fits of any kind, for their right to them would have expired. Such an
interpretation is contrary to the status quo doctrine, static or dy-
namic-parties cannot prevent survival of all terms and conditions of
employment. In fact, it is precisely this occurrence, that is, changes in
employment conditions in the post-expiration situation, that the sta-
tus quo doctrine seeks to prevent.439 Although the parties can place a
limit on the duration of the entire CBA, there is no such limitation on
433 Suffolk County, 18 Pub. Employment Rel. Bd. (Lab. Rel. Press) 3030, at 3062
(N.Y. Pub. Employment Rel. Bd. Apr. 30, 1985).
434 Id.; see also Waterford Teachers Ass'n, 27 Pub. Employment Rel. Bd. 4540 (Lab.
Rel. Press) (N.Y. Pub. Employment Rel. Bd. Apr. 11, 1994) (denying step increases where
the parties limited the operation of the salary schedule to a specific three-year period).
435 See supra Part III.F.1.
436 See Suffolk County, 18 Pub. Employment Bd., 1 3030, at 3062.
437 See Davis Unified Sch. Dist., [Transfer Binder 4] Cal. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab.
Rel. Press) 11031, at 121, 124 (Cal. Pub. Employment Rel. Bd. Feb. 22, 1980).
438 Met (citation omitted).
439 See supra Part I.C.3.
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the duty to bargain in good faith, which is the precise duty that the
status quo doctrine seeks to preserve.440
3. Properly Refusing to Pay Step Increases If the State Legislature So
Requires
Even if the terms of the agreement result in a requirement to pay
step increases, an employer may have a complete defense to payment.
State legislatures, not courts, write the statutes that govern public sec-
tor labor relations. Any state legislature, at any time, could adopt a
rule specifying that a school board need not pay any scheduled step
increase after an agreement expires.441 The Katz rule is not a constitu-
tional requirement, because it involved application of federal, private-
sector labor law statutes. 442 Therefore, if a state created such a rule,
the local school boards must follow it. One commentator suggests
that "departures from the private sector approach may be justified in
the public sector by language differences between the NLRA and the
state collective bargaining legislation."443 An express prohibition of
the requirement to pay step increases would seem to provide the nec-
essary justification to deviate from the dynamic status quo rule: "an act
that might otherwise constitute unlawful unilateral action on the part
of a public employer nevertheless may be lawful if carried out in con-
formance with a statute or regulation requiring the employer's con-
duct."444 Exhibiting a possible trend in support of this statement, two
state supreme courts have recently found that adherence to state stat-
utes prevented teachers from receiving step increases after
expiration. 44
5
440 See Board of Trustees v. Associated COLT Staff, 659 A.2d 842, 848 (Me. 1995)
(Wathen, C.J., dissenting) ("The [University of Maine System Labor Relations Act] limits
the term of a collective bargaining agreement to three years, but it places no specific time
limit on the duty to bargain. The preservation of the status quo is an attribute of bargain-
ing in good faith ....").
441 In Vermont, one state legislator has tried to pass such a law eight times, without
success. See May, supra note 10, at 771.
442 See supra Part I.C.2.
443 Vause, supra note 60, at 567.
444 Id at 545. In a case on which this quotation sheds light, a school board adopted a
budget for the coming year while the parties were mediating an impasse over wages,
among other issues. See id. (citing Broward Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. School Bd.,
[Transfer Binder 4] Fla. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 1 4264 (Fla. Pub. Employ-
ment Rel. Comm'n July 14, 1978)). Such action was not an unlawful unilateral action
because state law required the school board to adopt a budget by a certain time. See id.
Although this situation differs from an express prohibition of post-expiration step in-
creases, the quote applies equally well.
445 New Hampshire prevented the payment of steps through interpretation of a statute
requiring approval of "cost items." See supra notes 322-41 and accompanying text. Maine
achieved this end through application of state statutes (1) prohibiting courts and the labor




New Hampshire's and Maine's recent adoptions of the static sta-
tus quo rule suggest a movement away from the dynamic status quo
rule, which a majority of states that. have faced the question of post-
expiration step increases have adopted. This fact, combined with
both growing pressure to constrain public spending and an increasing
frequency of collective bargaining agreement expiration before the
adoption of a successor agreement, indicate that the importance of
this issue will grow in the future. Some states may consider either
reversing existing law on the subject or adopting strategies that seek to
avoid agreement hiatus situations altogether. Other collective bar-
gaining states, without current precedent on the subject, are bound
to confront the issue in the future. As state courts and lawmakers
make these decisions, they should keep in mind that despite citizens'
rightful desire to spend public money carefully, the purpose of the
status quo doctrine is not to safeguard funds from unscrupulous distri-
bution; rather, it is to promote, in accordance with state labor policy,
effective and fair bargaining by both parties. Of the two major ap-
proaches, the dynamic status quo rule more accurately preserves the
relationship that existed between the parties under the agreement.
Those who find unfairness in the rule should recognize that the
amount necessary to fund step increases is fairly easy to determine,
and that the payment of step increases from year to year may not cost
school districts more money in the long run. After all, most new set-
flements contain retroactive payment of missed steps.
Ultimately, however, the care taken by the parties in drafting
their agreements may be the most effective way to completely avoid
this debate. The parties, to a large extent, should, and do, have con-
trol over what conditions will govern their relationship in the future.
A carefully drafted, fairly negotiated agreement that specifies what
happens during a lapse between agreements will prevent both litiga-
tion about what constitutes the status quo and subsequent delay in
reaching a new agreement. In addition, such a solution is optimal
because the parties will have reached it themselves. This outcome is
important because parties will accept the effects of a voluntarily nego-
tiated agreement more readily than they will embrace a solution that a
judge or an arbitrator imposes on them. Hopefully, if negotiating par-
ties realize that they are in the best position to draft an agreement to
govern their future relationship, their willingness to bargain will grow
and they will learn to solve their own dilemmas collaboratively and
effectively. Thus, in accordance with the ideal of local control over
requiring binding arbitration for wage issues, public moneys from wage increases not nego-
tiated by the employer. See supra notes 342-45 and accompanying text.
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local issues, express voluntary provisions regulating all aspects of post-
expiration conditions of employment provide the best answer to the
post-expiration dilemma.
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